Issues of concern to the Albanian lobby and advocacy groups
Debate
on the future of Kosova and Human Rights
Issues:
THE DEBATE:
WHAT RESPONSES HAVE BEEN TAKEN?
WHAT RESPONSES CAN BE TAKEN?
THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE - MISSION
STATEMENT (see www.AACL.com )
Welcome to the website of the Albanian American Civic League. The Civic League was founded by former Congressman Joseph DioGuardi and a board of Albanian Americans in 1989 as the only registered lobby in Washington, DC, representing the concerns and interests of the Albanian people.
The purpose of the Civic League is to further the human rights and the national cause of the divided nation of more than seven million Albanians living side by side in the Balkans in Albania, Kosova, western Macedonia, southeastern Montenegro, Presheve, Medvegje, Bujanovc (southern Serbia), and Chameria (northern Greece). By bringing the political perspectives of 400.000 Albanian Americans to the US Government, the civic League works to end the repression and oppression of Albanians living under hostile Slavic Communist regimes in the Balkans and to preserve the culture, identity and human rights of Albanians throughout the world.
Joseph DioGuardi's Congressional Records - The work of the Albanian American Civic League for Kosova and the Albanian national cause since 1989 is well documented on this web site (please see the AACL ten-year history). But what is not so well known are the many Congressional Resolutions, statements, letters, and hearings that were sponsored and promoted by Congressman Joe DioGuardi from 1985 to 1988 to publicize the terrible plight of the Albanian people of Kosova and to expose the terror imposed on them by Slobodan Milosevic. Here is the first installment of this important part of the foundation on which the independent State of Kosova is being built today.
Albanians a People Undone - This article, featured in the February 2000 issue of National Geographic, discusses the history and culture of the Albanian people in the Balkans and is accompanied by a beautiful photographic layout.
The Agony
of Kosova
-
Joseph DioGuardi provides in this
well-documented work a clear picture the systematic repression and atrocities
that Kosovar Albanian have suffered under Serbia's domination, and he
demonstrates the need for Kosova's indepenence as the only just and lasting
solution to the Balkan conflict.
(In progress - sections will be added shortly)
The Expulsion of the Albanians
- a memorandum presented in
March 7th, 1937 (two years before the "final solution" was formulated in Nazi
Germany) showing how the Serbian regime planned to brutally repress, expel, and
exterminate the Albanians of Kosova.
Rescue in Albania
- written by a prominent
Jewish American, this book tells how every Jew who was fortunate enough to make
it to Albanian lands during WWII was saved from the Holocaust through the heroic
deeds of the Albanian people.
Albanian translation available here
To visit the website of Albanian Students International click here.
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE STATUS OF KOSOVA: On May 18, Congressmen Hyde and Lantos cochaired an historic hearing on Kosova's current and future status. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi, Kosova Bishop Mark Sopi and his colleague Fr. Lush Gjergji, and the Hon. Ardian Gjini, Kosova's Minister of Environment, gave testimony. May 2005.
U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARING ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST EUROPE: On July 14, 2004, Senator George Voinovich presided at a hearing on “U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Europe: Unfinished Business in the Balkans.”Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi submitted written testimony in support of the independence of Kosova now. August 2004. Full text available in English and Albanian.
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC’S TRIAL IN THE HAGUE: As Milosevic’s trial in The Hague enters its final phase, the Civic League has decided to release Shirley Cloyes' analysis of his opening testimony, in which he blames Joe DioGuardi and the Albanian American Civic League for his fate. August 2004. Click here for English and Albanian, which was submitted at the request of the War Crimes Tribunal in advance of oral testimony given by DioGuardi and Cloyes at the Hague in March 2003. Click here to listen to Milosevic's testimony in low bandwidth and high bandwidth.
TIME IS RUNNING OUT IN KOSOVA. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi analyzes the violence that erupted in Kosova on March 17. March 2004. Click here for English and Albanian.
EXERT MORE PRESSURE ON BELGRADE TO DEMOCRATIZE. A comment about Western foreign policy for Serbia published by Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi in The Financial Times of London. March 17, 2004. Full text available here.
THE CIVIC LEAGUE CALLS FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEM REFORM IN KOSOVA. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi explains why the international community should support Kosova civil society’s call for open lists and a district system. March 2004. Click here for English and Albanian.
THE STATE OF THE ALBANIAN NATION. Joe DioGuardi assesses the political and economic status of the Albanian nation in today’s world against the backdrop of centuries of Albanian resistance to foreign aggression and occupation. March 2004. Full text available in English and Albanian.
H.RES. 28 REISSUED BY CONGRESSMEN LANTOS AND HYDE.On the night of President Bush’s State of the Union Message, the AACL executive board met inside the U.S. Capitol Building. That day Congressmen Tom Lantos and Henry Hyde sent a revised “Dear Colleague” to all 435 members of the U.S. House of Representatives with their bill, calling on the United States to declare its support for the independence of Kosova, and with Morton Abramowitz’s op-ed article, “Snatching Defeat in the Balkans.” January 2004. Click here for H. Res. 28, the story, and the photographs.
THE AACL TAKES ITS CASE FOR KOSOVA TO THE UNITED NATIONSBy Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi. In a lengthy and open exchange at the UN with U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, the Civic League made the case for unblocking privatization, gaining access to World Bank lending, and resolving Kosova’s final status. December 2003. Full text available here in English and Albanian.
THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE--FIFTEEN YEARS LATER. On the occasion of Flag Day, Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi reflects on the Civic League's accomplishments in 2003 in light of its past successes as the only officially registered and independent Albanian issue advocacy group in Washington, DC. November 2003.. Full text available here in English and Albanian.
REDISCOVERING MY ALBANIAN ROOTS. After the beatification of Mother Teresa in Rome, Joe DioGuardi took a Civic League delegation to Greci, his father's Arberesh birthplace and the home of the descendants of Skanderbeg's soldiers. Here he reflects on this legacy. November 2003.. Full text available here in English and Albanian.
U.S. MONTENEGRO: AN APARTHEID STATE IN THE HEART OF EUROPE. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi reports the results of the Albanian American Civic League's fact-finding mission to Ulqin, Ana e Malit, Kraja, and Tuzi with Congressman Tom Lantos. August 2003.. Full text available here in English and Albanian.
REFLECTING ON THE HISTORY OF ALBANIAN REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE: A JOURNEY THROUGH MONTENEGRO, MACEDONIA, AND KOSOVA by Hon. Joseph DioGuardi. August 2003.Full text available here in English and Albanian.
KOSOVA: OFFICIAL VERSUS PUBLIC REALITY. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi analyzes the results of a series of public meetings held by the Civic League in Gjilan, Podujeve, Peja, Gjakova, Suhareka, Prizren, Prishtina, and Drenice. July 2003. Full text available here.
U.S. HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE FUTURE OF KOSOVA: On May 21, Congressmen Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos convened an historic hearing on the independence of Kosova, at the urging of the Civic League. June 2003. Text of hearing report available here in English and Albanian. Joe DioGuardi's testimony available here in English and Albanian. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi's testimony available here in English and Albanian. Click here for photos.
House Resolution 28: The Congressional Resolution in support of the independence of Kosova now, which was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 27, 2003, by Congressman Tom Lantos, the Ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, and Congressman Henry Hyde, the Committee's Chairman. June 2003. Full text available here. For the history of H.Res. 28, click here.
THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE: ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC. A chronology of the Civic League's activities in relation to Kosova from 1986 to the indictment of Milosevic in 1999 by Joe DioGuardi and Shirley Cloyes. March 2002. Full text available here.
GOVERNOR GEORGE PATAKI PROCLAIMS NOVEMBER 28, 2001, AS ALBANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY IN NEW YORK STATE. November 2001. Full text available here.
TEN YEARS OF THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE: An Historic Chronology of Major Activities to Free Albanians in the Balkans from Slavic Domination and Communism, February 2000. Full text available here.
RESOLVING THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL QUESTION: A Public Declaration by the Albanian American Civic League, September 1999. Full text available here.
THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE
www.AACL.com
CHANGING HISTORY FOR FIFTEEN YEARS…
The First Albanian American Is
Elected to the U.S. Congress
November Joe DioGuardi, a Certified Public Accountant and a Republican, is elected
1984 to the U.S. House of Representatives by a very slim margin in a
Congressional District that had been controlled by the Democratic Party
for more than fifty years. He was born in the Bronx, New York, of an
Albanian father and an Italian mother, and he had no prior political
experience.
The DioGuardis Discover Their Real Albanian Roots
September At Joe DioGuardi’s 45th birthday celebration, his Albanian roots are
1985 discovered when Kosovar Albanians who had supported his election to
Congress, overheard his father, Joe, Sr., then aged seventy-two, speaking
in Albanian to his younger sister. Thereafter, the Albanian community
lobbied Joe about Kosova, reminding him of his connection by bloodline
to the Kosovar Albanians.
The First Resolution for Albanian Rights Is Introduced in the U.S. Congress
June After much lobbying by Albanian Americans from around the United
1986 States, who adopted Joe DioGuardi as their Albanian American
Congressman, and after much research by Joe’s staff, the first resolution
(H.Con.Res. 358) to protect Albanian human rights in the former
Yugoslavia is introduced by Joe in the U.S. House of Representatives.
The next day, Joe’s friend, Senator Bob Dole, introduces the same
resolution in the U.S. Senate (S.Con.Res. 150).
Caught by surprise, Serbian officials enlist their Russian and Greek
sponsors to use their lobbies in Washington to attack DioGuardi as a
provocateur and to get their friends in the State Department to kill the
resolution.
The battle lines for Albanian human rights and freedom are drawn openly
in Washington for the first time, and DioGuardi, surprised and stung by
the vehement opposition to his seemingly innocuous Resolution for basic
human rights, meets the challenge by personally lobbying over one
hundred Congressman in the following twelve months to gain their
support.
DioGuardi Is Reelected to Congress
November With elections every two years in the House of Representatives,
1986 DioGuardi, known by some as the accidental congressman, works hard to
win a second term against the well-known political figure, Bella Abzug,
who brought national attention to the race.
DioGuardi and Dole Introduce an Expanded Version of a
Resolution for Albanians in Kosova
June DioGuardi, after resuming his intense, personal lobbying efforts in the
1987 House, reintroduces an expanded version of the 1986 Resolution for justice
for Albanians in Kosova (H.Con.Res. 162)—this time with fifty-seven
Congressmen. Senator Dole accommodates Joe by reintroducing the same
Resolution in the Senate (S.Con.Res. 150).
Milosevic Comes to Power
July Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian banker, deceives his personal and political
1987 mentor in Yugoslavia and seizes control of the Communist Party and the
Presidency of Yugoslavia. An ardent nationalist, who unlike his
predecessor, Marshal Tito, openly disdains the Albanian people of
Yugoslavia , he calls for their suppression and total control as “enemies of
the state.” He also tries to promote his agenda in Washington and against
DioGuardi by enlisting the support of his former American colleagues,
Henry Kissinger (former Secretary of State), Larry Eagleburger (former
Ambassador to Yugoslavia), Messrs. Brent Scowcroft and Scanlon (former
State Department officials in Yugoslavia), Maryland Congresswoman
Helen Bentley, a Serbian American and ardent Serbian nationalist
supported by the Greek lobby, including Senator Paul Sarbanes, also from
Bentley’s home State, and Congressman Jim Moody, who openly dealt with
and supported Serbs in Congress.
The U.S. State Department Exposes Its Pro-Yugoslavia, Anti-Albanian Policy
October The State Department, under much pressure from the Greek lobby and the
1987 former colleagues and friends of Milosevic, who worked hard behind the
scenes to promote Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia and to disparage
DioGuardi and the Albanian case for human rights, sends a letter to
Congressman Dante Fascell, then chairman of the House International
Relations Committee. The letter denounces the DioGuardi Resolution as an
affront to U.S. friend and ally Yugoslavia, and blames the Albanians of
Kosova for crimes against the Serbian people there.
First Congressional Hearing on Kosova Authorized
November Using his friendship and powers of persuasion with the Democratic
1987 Chairman Dante Fascell (D-FL), and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Human Rights, Gus Yatron (D-PA), DioGuardi prevails against the State
Department in getting a Congressional Hearing on his Resolution, which for
the first time openly exposes the barbaric and egregious abuse of human
rights by Serbs against the defenseless Albanians of Kosova.
First Major Albanian Rally in Front of the United Nations
June DioGuardi leads a massive demonstration by Albanians from around
1988 America in New York City in front of the United Nations and in Washington
in front of the White House and the Capitol, to make the U.S. press and
public more aware of the desperate plight of Albanians in Yugoslavia,
especially in Kosova.
DioGuardi and Congressman Lantos Confront the U.S. State Department
September DioGuardi works with his friend and colleague Congressman Tom Lantos,
1988 a prominent Jewish American Congressman from California and Chairman
of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, to arrange a high level meeting
with State Department officials and the Ambassador from Yugoslavia to
confront our flawed and failing U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans. The
meeting, spearheaded by Lantos, an ardent supporter of Albanian human
rights, is a great success and Milosevic recalls his ambassador to the United
States in a show of contempt.
DioGuardi Narrowly Loses His Third Election
November In a bitterly fought election campaign against former NY Secretary of State
1988 and multimillionaire liberal Democrat Nita Lowey, DioGuardi loses his seat
in Congress the way he won it—by a very slim margin. The loss is a great
surprise to all, but was due to many factors, including Vice President Bush’s
poor Presidential election results in New York (Governor Mike Dukakis won
New York State in 1988), the work of the Greek lobby on behalf of Lowey,
and illegally unreported money used at the last minute to smear DioGuardi,
for which Lowey was fined $3,500 by the FEC two years later.
The Albanian American Civic League Is Formed
January Undaunted by his loss, DioGuardi announces that he will run again for
1989 Congress after redistricting in 1991, and proceeds to form the Albanian
American Civic League to continue to lobby the U.S. Congress and the Bush
administration on behalf of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, especially in
Kosova.
Feb.-Oct. With more time to devote to Albanian issues, DioGuardi and three of his
1989 former key staff, now paid by the AACL, intensify Congressional pressure
against the pro-Serb State Department policy and by engaging in mass
demonstrations, sending out press releases, and causing Congressional
statements to be issued by our friends in Congress.
The First Major Rally in Washington Is Held
June The first Washington rally is held to free Kosova from Serbian occupation
1989 and to free Albanian dissident Adem Demaci from prison.
Congress Passes First Albanian Rights Resolution
July The June rally sparks the passage of Civic League-sponsored House
1989 (H.Con.Res. 314) and Senate (S.Con.Res 124) resolutions condemning Serbia
for human rights abuses in Kosova. This leads to the immediate removal of
the Serbian ambassador to the United States by Slobodan Milosevic.
DioGuardi Takes First Trip to Belgrade and Prishtina to Confront Milosevic
November DioGuardi goes to Belgrade’s International Press Center and
1989 Milosevic’s office with a letter signed by Senator Bob Dole and
twelve other U.S. Senators to free Kosova. He then makes his first
trip to Kosova to witness firsthand the brutal Serbian occupation and is
evicted from the Grand Hotel in Prishtina for conducting a press conference
there.
DioGuardi and Rugova Support Democracy in Slovenia
January DioGuardi joins Rugova in Ljubljana to meet with the Albanian community to
1990 promote freedom for Kosova and to support the first democratic elections in
Slovenia.
DioGuardi Brings the Congressional Human Rights Caucus to
Belgrade and Prishtina
February DioGuardi goes to Belgrade with the staff of the Congressional
1990 Human Rights Caucus, chaired by Congressmen Lantos and Porter,
to conduct a press conference in Belgrade about Serbian oppression
of Kosova’s Albanians. He then makes an unannounced visit to Kosova to
meet leading intellectuals, journalists, and activists, including Dr. Zekeria
Cana, Zenun Celaj, Bajram Kelmendi, Ibrahim Rugova, Rexhep Qosja, and
Vetton Surroi.
The Serbian Secret Police (UDBA) Under Milosevic’s Control Kill Enver Hadri
Kosovar activist Enver Hadri is assassinated in Brussels, and
DioGuardi is invited to give a eulogy at his funeral before
thousands of mourners. Afterwards, he travels to Geneva at the
request of Hadri’s widow and son to deliver to the United Nations
Human Rights Commission the list of 34 peaceful Albanian
demonstrators killed by Serbian authorities that was found on Hadri’s body
at the time of his death.
Kosova Comes to Washington for the First Time
April The Civic League sponsors a delegation of ten Albanian leaders from
1990 Kosova to testify against Milosevic’s occupation of Kosova at an historic
Congressional Human Rights Caucus Hearing for Kosova in Washington
and to be honored at an historic dinner at the Sheraton Hotel in New York
City, attended by 2,700 Albanian Americans, to “Salute Freedom and
and Democracy for Kosova.”
DioGuardi Brings Lantos to Kosova to Expose Milosevic’s
Modern Day “Warsaw Ghetto”
May Congressman Tom Lantos and Joe DioGuardi lead a delegation to
1990 Kosova to challenge the brutal Serbian occupation of Kosova. They blast
Milosevic as a modern day tyrant bent on policies that will destroy any
democracy in Yugoslavia.
July DioGuardi is officially banned from returning to Yugoslavia by the
1990 Milosevic controlled parliament in Belgrade for his press
conferences in Belgrade and Kosova as “hostile acts against the
State.”
DioGuardi Leads a Delegation to Australia
DioGuardi leads a delegation to Melbourne and Canberra, Australia to enlist
the help of the large Albanian community there and then Foreign Minister
Gareth Evans in freeing Kosova from Serbian occupation.
DioGuardi and Lantos Form the Interparliamentary Group
for Kosova in Luxembourg
January DioGuardi brings Iljaz Ramali, speaker of the exiled Kosova Assembly, to
1991 Luxembourg to meet with Congressman Tom Lantos and Lord Nicholas
Bethel of the British and European Parliaments to sign a joint declaration
proclaiming an “Interparliamentary Group for Kosova’s Protection,” as a
strategy to further expose Milosevic’s occupation of Kosova.
DioGuardi Calls Milosevic the “New Hitler” in the U.S. Senate
February DioGuardi testifies before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
1991 cochaired by Senators Joe Biden and Claiborne Pell, and makes the first
public case for the independence of Kosova under international law. In the
process, he compares Milosevic to Hitler, Stalin, and Saddam Hussein and
issues a press release calling Milosevic the “Saddam of Serbia.”
DioGuardi Goes to Albania with the National Republican Institute
March The Civic League goes to Albania with the National Republican Institute to
1991 monitor the first election in Albania and is the first organization to declare the
Communist Party victory illegal and the elections a sham.
DioGuardi Declines Invitation from Croatia’s President Tudjman
May DioGuardi declines an invitation to visit Croatian President Franjo Tudjman,
1991 after he publicly states that he considers Kosova to be an internal problem of
Serbia.
The Albanian Lobby Takes Its Case to the Helsinki Commission
June DioGuardi goes to Copenhagen, Denmark, to meet the Albanian community
1991 and attend a Helsinki Commission Conference. He addresses a massive
Albanian rally just outside the conference hall and conducts a press conference
about human rights abuses in Kosova, showing for the first time enlarged
photographs of Albanians brutally tortured and killed by the Serbian police
at the direction of Slobodan Milosevic.
Senator Dole Greets 10,000 Albanian Demonstrators in Washington
and Goes to Kosova
July The Civic League sponsors a massive rally in Washington in front of the White
1991 House and the U.S. Capitol. More than 10,000 Albanian Americans march
from the White House to Capitol Hill and demonstrate for freedom for Kosova.
Senators Bob Dole, Claiborne Pell, Larry Pressler, and Al D’Amato and
Congressmen Gilman, Lantos, Porter, and Broomfield address the crowd.
August At the request of the Civic League, Bob Dole and six other U.S. Senators visit
1991 Prishtina to see firsthand the brutality of Milosevic.
The Civic League Stops U.S. Aid to Serbia
October The Civic League lobbies for and passes economic sanctions banning aid to
1991 Serbia under the Nickles-D’Amato Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill.
The Civic League Gets Lantos to Introduce a Resolution for the
Independence of Kosova
January The Civic League introduces a well-documented Congressional Resolution
1992 (H.Con.Res. 264) cosponsored by Congressmen Lantos and Gilman calling for
the recognition of the independence of Kosova.
Demaci Comes to Washington
March The Civic League brings Adem Demaci, after 28 years in Serbian jails, to
1992 Washington to discuss the crisis in Kosova with Secretary of State Larry
Eagleburger and to New York to meet with Mayor David Dinkins at Gracie
Mansion, where he is honored as the Nelson Mandela of the Albanian
people.”
The Civic League Monitors Elections in Albania and Macedonia
DioGuardi leads a Civic League delegation to Albania to monitor the second
elections, bringing more than 50 Albanians from Macedonia in cars stocked with
gas and food to help the democratic forces overcome the advantages of the
Communists in the rural areas.
DioGuardi brings Paul Weyrich, president of the Free Congress Foundation, and
John Fund of The Wall Street Journal to Macedonia to monitor the referendum
on political and cultural autonomy for the one million Albanians in Macedonia.
The Civic League Brings Arbnori to the Prayer Breakfast
February The Civic League brings Pjeter Arbnori, speaker of the Albanian
1993 Parliament to meet with Congressmen Gilman and Lantos and to attend
the annual Prayer Breakfast in Washington, DC, as a special guest
representing Albania.
DioGuardi Attends Historic Investiture of Albanian Archbishops in Shkodra
April Sali Berisha officially invites DioGuardi and a Civic League
1993 delegation to join him, Pope John Paul II, Mother Teresa, and
Cardinal John O’Conner in Shkodra at the historic investiture of
four Albanian archbishops in the newly renovated cathedral.
DioGuardi Leads Congressional Delegation to Albania and Macedonia
September DioGuardi leads a Congressional delegation to Albania and
1993 Macedonia to make the case (in Congress) for U.S. sponsorship
of NATO membership for Albania and to press the Macedonian
government to conduct an internationally-sponsored census as the
first step to securing human rights and equality for the country’s one
million Albanians.
Shirley Cloyes Joins the Albanian Lobby
October Joe DioGuardi meets Shirley Cloyes, then publisher of Lawrence Hill Books,
1993 who is working on a book entitled Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare, the first to
bring the perspective of the anti-Milosevic, anti-war opposition inside the
former Yugoslavia to U.S. readers.
The Civic League Attends the First International Conference for
Investment in Albania
November DioGuardi leads a Civic League delegation to the First
1993 International Conference for Investment in Albania. His speech
emphasizes that the real potential of Albania is not only in its
vast mineral resources, but in its diaspora of millions of successful
Albanians around the world.
The Civic League Introduces Clinton to Rugova
February Joe DioGuardi and Civic League Balkan Affairs Adviser Shirley Cloyes bring
1994 Kosova President Ibrahim Rugova and Prime Minister-in-exile Bujar Bukoshi
to Washington, DC, to meet President Bill Clinton at a private reception
before the annual Prayer Breakfast, to hold a press conference on Capitol Hill
about Kosova’s occupation by Milosevic, and to participate in a special tour
and special tour and reception at the newly opened U.S. Holocaust Memorial
Museum.
DioGuardi Goes to Turkey to Win Support for Kosova
March DioGuardi addresses a Balkan peace conference in Istanbul, sponsored by the
1994 Balkan Solidarity Foundation, and publicly condemns Milosevic, Tudjman,
Gligorov, the Greek government, Lords Owen and Carrington, and the U.S.
State Department for their roles in suppressing the Albanian people of
The Civic League Helps Create the U.S.-Albanian
Underwater Archaeological Project
The Civic League brings a delegation of archaeologists to Tirana to organize a
U.S.-Albanian cooperative underwater exploration off the Albanian coast for
the purpose of establishing the true identity of the Albanian people as direct
descendants of the Illyrians—the only indigenous people of the Balkans.
The Civic League Conducts First Rally Calling for U.S. Troops
April The first rally calling for U.S. troops in Kosova is led by DioGuardi in front
1994 of the United Nations in New York City.
Congressman Gilman Introduces a Resolution Asking Clinton to
Protect the Rights of the Kosovars
May Congressman Gilman introduces a resolution (H.Con.Res. 251) calling on
1994 President Clinton to report to the Congress within 60 days about the
conditions in Kosova and to make recommendations for protecting the rights
of Kosovars, including the possibility of establishing an international
protectorate for Kosova together with other members of the UN Security
Council and the European Union.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Create the First Hearing on the Albanian National Cause
February DioGuardi and Cloyes create the first Congressional hearing on the
1995 Albanian dimension of the Balkan conflict, including Arben Xhaferi, Fadil
Sulejmani, Iliaz Halmi, and Ismet Ramadani from Macedonia, Bujar
Bukoshi from Kosova, Gjerg Gjokaj from Montenegro, and Riza Halimi
from Presheve.
The Jewish Lobby Becomes a Partner with the Civic League for Kosova
February The Civic League makes the addition of Albania to the “Righteous among
1995 Nations” section of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum a reality. Three
Jewish congressmen, Gilman, Lantos, and Nadler, cochair and speak at a
League-sponsored ceremony and reception commemorating the installation.
The connection is made for the first time between the ethnic cleansing in
Kosova and the genocide of the Jewish people in the minds of Jewish
American leaders.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Help Open the University of Tetova
February DioGuardi, Cloyes, and Yugoslav dissident Mihaljo Mihaljov
1995 travel to Macedonia at the invitation of Albanian leaders there to
monitor the opening of the University of Tetova on February 15.
On the morning of their departure, the Macedonian government
attacks the university, killing a student, wounding hundreds, and
jailing professors.
Gilman Introduces a Resolution Making the Lifting of Sanctions Against Serbia Conditional on Improvements in Kosova
March Congressman Gilman introduces a resolution (H.Con.Res. 1360),
1995 conditioning the lifting of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro on
improvements in Kosova. The resolution details the horrors of the
occupation and states that “the rights of the people of Kosova to govern
themselves and to establish a separate identity for Kosova must not be
denied.”
The Civic League Calls a UN Rally to Protest Crackdown on the University of Tetova by the Macedonian Military
Two thousand Albanian Americans flock to the UN for a Civic League-
sponsored rally to protest the crackdown on the University of Tetova on
February 21. Congressman Gilman addresses the crowd.
DioGuardi and Cloyes attend Masses at the Vatican and in Albania
for “Our Lady of Shkodra”
May DioGuardi and Cloyes travel to Rome, Genazzano, and Shkodra to
1995 commemorate the miracle of “Our Lady of Shkodra” with a large
delegation of Albanians from the United States and Europe.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Attend Opening in Vlore of the
U.S-Albanian Marine Archaeological Project
July DioGuardi and Cloyes participate in a ceremony in Vlore to mark the
1995 signing of the U.S.-Albanian cooperation agreement for underwater
archaeological exploration of the Albanian Coast—a project that they
facilitated between the Institute of Archaeology in Tirana and the
University of Miami.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Join Congressman Gilman on an Official Visit to Albania
August DioGuardi and Cloyes join Congressman Ben Gilman for an official visit
1995 in Tirana with Albanian President Sali Berisha and his cabinet to discuss
national security issues for the United States and Albania in the Balkans.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Make the Case in Turkey Against Milosevic and for the Independence of Kosova
September DioGuardi and Cloyes travel to Istanbul, Turkey, to speak about the Balkan
1995 conflict and to make the case for the independence of Kosova at the
National Press Center and at a seminar with key members of the faculty for
international affairs at the University of Marmara.
Congress Demands Official Recognition of the University of Tetova
and the Release of Jailed Founders
January Ben Gilman introduces a resolution calling for the Macedonian
1996 government to guarantee the national rights of the Albanian population,
to officially recognize the University of Tetova, and to free the university’s
imprisoned founders (H. Con. Res. 103).
June Congressmen Lantos, Nadler, Gilman, and Traficant speak out on the House
1996 floor and on C-SPAN in support of H. Con. Res 103.
July A delegation from Macedonia led by Arben Xhaferi comes to Washington to
1996 discuss increasing threats to the University of Tetova and to meet with the
Albanian community in New York. The Civic League sponsors a UN rally in
support of the University of Tetova and its jailed founders.
Cloyes Testifies Before Congress on Behalf of Albania
Cloyes testifies at a Congressional hearing on human rights and democracy in
Albania and exposes the role of Nicholas Gage of the Panepirotic Federation
and the Albanian Communists in attempting to overthrow the Berisha
government.
Gilman Reintroduces Resolution Calling for Albanian Equality in Macedonia
January The Civic League gets Congressman Gilman to immediately reintroduce the
1997 Resolution for the University of Tetova and Albanian rights in Macedonia
(H.Con. Res. 36).
A Civic League Delegation Monitors Second Round of
Presidential Elections in Albania
June DioGuardi and Cloyes lead a Civic League delegation to Albania to monitor the
1997 second round of presidential elections and to attend rallies and press
conferences with the democratic leaders. Under questionable circumstances, the
Berisha government loses the election and the Socialist Party under Fatos Nano
comes to power.
The Civic League Responds to the Macedonian Military Attack
on Gostivar and Tetova
July The Civic League brings Arben Xhaferi, Fadil Sulejmani, and Milaim Fejziu to
1997 meet with Congressmen Gilman and Traficant and the State Department,
following the Macedonian government’s military attack on the cities of Gostivar
and Tetova, which left three dead, a hundred wounded, and four hundred jailed.
The Civic League holds a rally outside the UN to demand the release of
Gostivar Mayor Rufi Osmani and Tetova Mayor Alajdin Demiri from prison.
Afterwards, the delegation meets with the representative of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees in New York about the Macedonian attack on
Albanian municipalities and the Serbian occupation of Kosova. In response to
an almost universal press blackout in the West, the Civic League produces a
videotape entitled “Crisis in Macedonia.”
The Civic League Begins Distribution of Rescue in Albania to the House and Senate
October At the Civic League’s request, Congressmen Lantos and Gilman write a
1997 foreword to Rescue in Albania by Harvey Sarner. The League begins
distribution of 10,000 copies to demonstrate the courage and tolerance of the
Albanian people who saved Jews from the Nazis in World War II.
Congressmen Gilman and Traficant send the book with a personal letter to each
Jewish member of Congress and with a “Dear Colleague” letter to the other
members.
The Civic League Declares its Support for the Kosova Liberation Army
February The Civic League issues a public declaration, “In Defense of the Albanian
1998 National Cause,” in which it announces its support for the Kosova Liberation
Army and condemns the neo-Communist government of Fatos Nano for its
corrupt politics and abandonment of the Albanian national cause.
The Civic League Tells Congress that the KLA Is Not a “Terrorist Group
March The Civic League shifts the focus of a Congressional hearing with Balkan
1998 envoy Robert Gelbard from Bosnia to Kosova. Under questioning instigated
by the Civic League, Gelbard is forced to retract his earlier, erroneous
depiction of the KLA as a “terrorist” organization. The retraction creates a
storm in the Western media, and overnight the attempt to “criminalize”
the KLA is halted. In an historic confrontation, Cloyes tells Gelbard that
“the KLA is not a terrorist group, and that the 500,000 Albanians in America
are all KLA.” After the hearing, the Civic League holds the first rally on
Capitol Hill in support of the Kosova Liberation Army.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Call Congress to Support U.S. Intervention in Kosova
and to Indict Milosevic
March DioGuardi testifies before the Congressional Helsinki Committee, calling for
1998 U.S. intervention in Kosova before Milosevic kills more Albanians.
May DioGuardi testifies at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on
1998 Kosova, criticizing U.S. foreign policy there and clashing with Biden over the
need for U.S. military intervention.
June DioGuardi again testifies before the Congressional Helsinki Committee, this
1998 time about the Serbian invasion of Kosova and the need to indict Slobodan
Milosevic as a war criminal.
July Al D’Amato in the Senate and Chris Smith in the House pass Civic League-
1998 sponsored Resolutions (S.Con.Res. 105 and H.Con.Res. 304) calling for the
indictment of Slobodan Milosevic as a war criminal.
Congressman Jim Traficant, with international legal expertise retained by the
Civic League, introduces H. Con. Res. 312, calling the Clinton administration
to recognize the legal right of Kosovar Albanians to self-determination and
independence from Serbia.
August Cloyes begins work with the Transnational Radical Party on the documentation
1998 to be submitted to The Hague to indict Milosevic as a war criminal. In order to
establish the charge of “crimes against humanity,” international law requires
that an armed conflict between two armies must be established. Cloyes with
KLA assistance demonstrates that the KLA is a legitimate army, with a chain
of command, training
camps, courts, etc., and not a “guerrilla group.”
The Civic League Lobbies the Pope for Kosova
August DioGuardi and Cloyes travel to Rome to meet Pope John Paul II and to
1998 Bajram Curi, Albania, to meet with the Albanian refugees in the care of the
UNHCR at the request of Congressman Dana Rohrabacher and with
leaders of the KLA.
The Civic League Lobbies the European Commission for Kosova
September Emma Bonino, head of Human Rights for the European Commission, meets
1998 with the Civic League Board in New York City to discuss her trip to Kosova
during the Serbian summer offensive and her plans for ending the war.
The Civic League Lobbies Against Holbrooke’s Agreement with Milosevic
October The Civic League holds a rally in Manhattan, marching from the United
1998 Nations to the office of U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Richard
Holbrooke, to protest Holbrooke’s entering into the October agreement with
Milosevic—a diplomatic holding pattern that would lead to the infamous
massacre of Albanians at Racak.
The Civic League Goes to London, France, and Tirana for Kosova
January DioGuardi and Cloyes meet with the leaders of the Albanian community in
1999 London at a dinner organized by UCK representative Pleurat Sejdiu and then
travel to Paris to participate in a UCK-sponsored event for the Albanian
community in France.
February DioGuardi and Cloyes go to Rambouillet, France, to speak at a KLA-
1999 sponsored demonstration outside the peace talks.
DioGuardi and Cloyes are keynote speakers at an international conference in
Tirana on Kosova and peace and stability in the Balkans. They make the
case for the independence of Kosova at a press conference with former
Albanian President Sali Berisha and on Albanian TV and radio. DioGuardi
and Cloyes also confront Albanian President Pandeli Majko about his failure
to publicly support the independence of Kosova.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Advocate on U.S. and International TV and Radio
for Kosova
January – July DioGuardi and Cloyes represent the Albanian viewpoint on more than
1999 50 U.S. and international TV and radio broadcasts, including CNN
International, CNN, Fox-TV, BBC-TV, NBC, MSNBC, WPIX, and
CNBC—before and after the NATO bombing campaign.
March Cloyes testifies after Senator Bob Dole, Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick,
1999 and Henry Kissinger before the House International Relations
Committee in support of U.S. troop deployment to Kosova.
The Civic League holds a rally in front of the UN, calling the U.S.
government to arm the KLA and deploy troops to defend the people of
Kosova. DioGuardi and Cloyes march with 5,000 demonstrators to the
Serbian mission.
The Civic League holds a second rally in front of the UN with Jewish
leaders to protest the ongoing genocide in Kosova.
Congressman Traficant Calls Congress to Support Independence
and Indict Milosevic
April Traficant introduces the Kosovar Independence and Justice Act
1999 (H. Con. Res. 1425), calling for the arming of the KLA, the indictment
of Slobodan Milosevic as a war criminal, and the independence of
Kosova.
As the starvation, torture, mass expulsion, and murder of Kosovar
Albanians continues, the Civic League holds a rally in Washington, DC,
with Senator Joseph Lieberman and Congressmen Ben Gilman, Jim
Traficant, Stenny Hoyer, and Tom Lantos, calling the U.S. government
to arm the KLA, to grant Kosova independence, and to indict Milosevic
as a war criminal.
April to DioGuardi and Cloyes visit Jewish community leaders, conduct rallies,
July 1999 and do press interviews for Kosova in Dallas, Los Angeles, Detroit,
Chicago, Milwaukee, Miami, and Atlantic City.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Address Council of Muslim Communities Benefit
for Kosova in Canada
May DioGuardi and Cloyes travel to Vancouver, British Columbia, to meet with
1999 the Albanian community and to address a multiethnic, multireligious dinner
for the benefit of the work of Doctors without Borders in Kosova sponsored
by the Council of Muslim Communities in Canada.
Milosevic Is Indicted by the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia
On May 24, 1999, Slobodan Milosevic is indicted, along with four of his
military and security officials (Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragolub
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Ojdanic, and Vlajko Stojiljkovic) for war crimes and crimes against humanity
in Kosova. The indictment is accompanied by an international arrest warrant.
June DioGuardi and Cloyes travel to the Arberesh communities in Italy with
1999 National Geographic as advisers in preparation for a major article on the
the Albanian nation, which is later published in February 2000.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Travel to a Free Kosova and Report to Congress
August DioGuardi, Cloyes, and members of the Civic League Board meet with
1999 Arben Xhaferi in Macedonia and make their first trip to Kosova after the
NATO bombing campaign to report back to Congress on postwar conditions.
October DioGuardi and Cloyes are invited by Bishop Mark Sopi to attend an outdoor
1999 mass in Bizhtashin to commemorate all the Kosovars who sacrificed their
lives for freedom. The first mass in free Kosova, it is attended by more than
5,000 people. They then travel to Prishtina to meet with UNMIK economic
development adviser Joly Dixon and to Junik, Babaj Bokes, Peja, and Gjakova
to meet with residents and local officials.
November An official Civic League delegation of eighteen Civic League members, led
1999 by DioGuardi and Cloyes, meets with Arben Xhaferi in Tetova, celebrates
Flag Day in Prizren and Peja at the invitation of Major General Ramush
Haradinaj, and meets with Kosovar public figures and professionals in
Prizren, Prishtina, and Gjakova.
Civic League Holds Rally in Manhattan with Senator John McCain to Demand
the Release of Kosovar Albanian POWs in Serbian Jails
February The Civic League holds a rally in midtown Manhattan calling for the release
2000 of Kosovar Albanian prisoners of war in Serbian jails. The rally is timed to
coincide with Senator John McCain’s visit to New York for his presidential
campaign. He addresses the rally and then members of the Civic League
Board attend his fundraising reception and luncheon inside the Hyatt
Regency. Cloyes turns over the list of prisoners to his staff at the reception,
and McCain, a former POW, agrees to write the first of several letters to
President Clinton and, later, the Bush administration appealing for their
release.
AACL Convinces the House Committee on International Relations to Hold a Hearing on How to Win the Peace in Postwar Kosova
April The Civic League brings Ramush Haradinaj, Muhamet Mustafa, Bajram
2000 Rexhepi, Esad Stavileci, and Shyqyri Kelmendi to the House Committee
on International Relations to present the political and economic obstacles to
the reconstruction of Kosova, including the need to block access to all but
humanitarian aid to Serbia until Slobodan Milosevic is indicted and the
Albanian prisoners of war, illegally transported to Serbia at war’s end in
violation of the Geneva Conventions, are freed.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Meet the Albanian Refugee Communities in Italy
September DioGuardi and Cloyes are invited by the Albanian communities in Rome,
2000 Ancona, Florence, Treviso, and Trieste that have fled the Serbian military in
Kosova and economic deprivation and political persecution in Albania. The
purpose of the trip is to organize a collective response to anti-Albanian
racism and to strengthen the international impact of the Albanian lobby.
From there they travel to Kosova to work with the Alliance for the Future of
Kosova in preparation for the municipal elections.
The Civic League Brings Ramush Haradinaj to New York,
Chicago, and Washington, DC
Ramush Haradinaj addresses the Albanian American community for the first
time in a 400-person meeting in Yonkers, New York, and at the Albanian
American Islamic Center in suburban Chicago, and then meets with members
of the House, Senate, and State Department in Washington.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Celebrate Flag Day in Australia and New Zealand
November DioGuardi and Cloyes are invited by the Albanian communities in
2000 Melbourne and Auckland to celebrate Flag Day and to lobby
government officials in Canberra and Wellington to recognize Kosova’s
right to independence under international law.
The Civic League Attends the Bush Inauguration
January AAK President Ramush Haradinaj, former Albanian President Sali Berisha,
2001 and fifty members of the Civic League travel to Washington for the
inauguration of President George W. Bush and for meetings with the State
Department and members of the House and Senate.
DioGuardi and Cloyes Visit Macedonia, Kosova, and the Presheve Valley to Assess Conditions for the House International Relations Committee
March Cloyes and DioGuardi meet with Albanian leaders, President Boris
2001 Trajkovski, and Prime Minister Lubjco Georgievski to push for Albanian
rights in Macedonia on the eve of the National Liberation Army uprising in
Tanusha. They then travel to Gjilane, where they meet with Presheve Mayor
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Riza Halimi and then cross the border into southern Serbia to meet with
Shefqet Musliu, Sami Azemi, and other leaders of the Liberation Army of
Presheve, Medvegje, and Bujanoc (UCPMB) at their headquarters in Koncul to
discuss their peace plan.
The National Security Council Convenes a Meeting at the White House with the Help of the Albanian American Civic League
Returning to Washington as the war breaks out in Macedonia, Cloyes writes a
major article, “Resolving the Crisis in Macedonia,” which is applauded by
Ambassador James Dobbins, then Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs. The NSC asks the Civic League to select leaders in the Albanian
American community to attend a meeting at the White House to discuss the
need for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis in Macedonia.
The Civic League works from March to November, meeting almost every
week in Washington with members of Congress, the State Department, and the
NSC, to make sure they understand that granting Albanians their rights is the
only way to end the Macedonian conflict and that Albanian leaders Arben
Xhaferi and Ali Ahmeti hold the keys to a peaceful solution.
Civic League Delegation Goes to Tirana to Promote Democracy Building
April Joe DioGuardi and members of the Civic League travel to Tirana to promote
2001 greater participation by the people of Albania in the June parliamentary
elections and to focus international attention on the unresolved problems in
election laws and procedures.
Milosevic Is Surrendered to The War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague and Is Charged with Genocide
June In a great triumph for the victims of war crimes and genocide in Bosnia,
2001 Croatia, and Kosova, Slobodan Milosevic is transferred to the International
War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague on June 28.
Senator Joseph Biden Holds His First Hearing as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Crisis in Macedonia
DioGuardi and Cloyes attend Senator Biden’s first hearing as the new
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “The Crisis in
Macedonia and U.S. Engagement in the Balkans.” Cloyes and DioGuardi
begin intensive work with the Biden foreign policy staff to challenge Bush
administration policy on the Balkans.
The Civic League Hosts an Evening in Honor of General Wesley Clark
July On the occasion of the publication of his book, Waging Modern War: Bosnia,
2001 Kosova, and the Future of Combat, the Civic League hosts a reception and
book signing for Clark, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe. The Civic League gives Clark its first Balkan Peace Award.
Milosevic’s Cover-Up of Mass Murder in Kosova is Revealed
War crimes investigators establish that Milosevic ordered the bodies of
hundreds of civilians murdered in Kosova to be exhumed, driven to
Serbia in refrigerated trucks, and reburied in secret mass graves.
Prosecutors believe that the evidence will help prosecutors secure a life
sentence at the end of the trial in The Hague. The Civic League is
instrumental in determining the fate of three Albanian American brothers
who were U.S. citizens (Agron, Mehmet, and Ylli Bytyqi), whose bodies
are discovered in a mass grave in Petrovo Selo, Serbia.
Congressman Gilman Meets with the Civic League and Albanian leaders
from the Presheve Valley in New York
August The Civic League brings Presheve Mayor Riza Halimi, Ternoc Mayor Galip
2001 Beqiri, and Shaip Kamberi, head of the Center for Human Rights in Bujanoc,
to meet with Congressman Gilman for a three-hour discussion of ongoing
human rights abuses by Serbian authorities and the deterioration of the peace
implementation process in the Presheve Valley. Gilman responds with a
forceful letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell.
The Civic League Participates in Kosova’s First National Elections
September, A delegation of Civic League Board members participate in the pre-election
November and Election Day process in Kosova’s first national elections and hold a
2001 press conference at the Illyria Hotel on key issues facing Albanians in the
Balkans.
November The International War Crimes Tribunal charges Milosevic with genocide
2001 against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Civic League Holds Historic Meeting with Senator Biden in Manhattan
December Senator Biden meets for three hours with Civic League Board members and
2001 supporters at the Columbus Club in Manhattan to analyze the history of U.S.
government response to the Balkan conflict and to discuss a strategy for
convincing the Bush administration not to withdraw U.S. troops from Kosova
and not to take a back seat to Europe in Macedonia.
Milosevic Goes on Trial in The Hague
February Slobodan Milosevic goes on trial in The Hague, facing 66 counts on three
2002 indictments for genocide and war crimes spanning a decade in Bosnia, and
crimes against humanity in Croatia and Kosova. On February 15, in his
opening statement, Milosevic attacks and defames the Albanian American
Civic League and Joe DioGuardi for supporting “Albanian terrorism and
separatism” in Kosova and for making “a great contribution to the systematic
expansion of the anti-Serb mood and the ‘Satanisation’ of the Serb people in
the American public opinion.”
DioGuardi and Cloyes Meet with Milosevic’s Prosecutors in The Hague
April DioGuardi and Cloyes travel to The Hague in The Netherlands, where
2002 DioGuardi is interviewed by the Office of the Chief Prosecutor at the
International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as the final
step to becoming a witness against Slobodan Milosevic at his trial in The Hague.
Earlier, Cloyes, at the request of the ICTY, had submitted a detailed testimony in
writing in response to 300 pages of Milosevic’s opening statements, in which he
blamed NATO and the West for the atrocities and genocide that he committed in
Bosnia and Kosova.
The Civic League is Called to Washington to Meets with
the new U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia
At the request of Larry Butler, the new U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, and
Ambassador James Holmes, the new U.S. envoy to the Stabililty Pact, the Civic
League brings a delegation to Washington to discuss the roots of the Macedonian
conflict and the implementation of the Oher peace agreement.
The Civic League Hosts a “Salute to Albanian Freedom” on the 12th Anniversary of the Historic April 28, 1990 Sheraton Dinner
The Albanian American Civic Leagues hosts a delegation of Albanian leaders from
all Albanian lands in the Balkans to salute Albanian freedom with Senator Joe
Biden and Congressmen Ben Gilman and Tom Lantos on the 12th anniversary of
the historic Sheraton dinner saluting “freedom and democracy in Kosova.” After
the dinner, the delegation meets with Congressional and Bush administration
leaders in Washington to emphasize their roles in bringing peace and stability to
Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Presheve
May The Civic League brings Pjeter Arbnori, Ramush Haradinaj, Iliaz
Halimi, Rufi Osmani, Nikolle Camaj, Ferhat Dinosha, and Riza
Halimi to Washington for briefings with the House International
Relations Committee and the Congressional Human Rights Caucus,
where they are officially received as representatives of the
“Albanian nation.”
June After a trip to Kosova, DioGuardi and Cloyes convince Congressmen
Gilman and Lantos to introduce House Resolution 467 in support of
the independence of Kosova now, breaking the silence imposed by
the international community about Kosova’s final status.
The Civic League gives Senator Joe Biden its second annual Balkan
Peace Award in the presence of Kosova Assembly Speaker Nexhat
Daci in Washington, DC.
September Congressman Lantos, Cloyes, and DioGuardi travel to Detroit, where
they publicly announce the Civic League’s plan to internationalize the
plight of Albanians in Montenegro.
December Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International
Relations Committee, comes to New York City to meet with the Board
and key supporters of the Civic League. He declares that the Bush
administration’s policy in Kosova of “standards before status” is a
“cart-before-horse” approach that will lead to another Gaza Strip,
this time in the heart of Europe.
2003
January With the opening of a new Congress, Chairman Hyde and
Congressman Lantos reintroduce the resolution in support of
Kosova’s independence as House Resolution 28.
March Congressman Tom Lantos joins the Civic League and the Atlantic
Battalion in Yonkers, New York, for the commemoration of the
memorial to the Bytyqi brothers (Albanian Americans who were
murdered by the Serbian police after the war) and the anniversary
of the death of Adem Jashari.
May The Civic League Board attends the unveiling of the official portrait
of Chairman Henry Hyde in the House International Relations
Committee Hearing Room.
Congressman Hyde and Lantos convene a hearing at the urging of
the Civic League on the independence of Kosova, at which
DioGuardi and Cloyes testify. Lantos and Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher vigorously oppose the U.S. State Department policy
in Kosova of “standards before status.”
June The Civic League gives its third annual Balkan Peace Award to
Congressman Tom Lantos, Chairman Henry Hyde, and retired
Congressman Ben Gilman in recognition of their pathbreaking work
on behalf of Kosova’s independence.
August Congressman Lantos and the Civic League, with the support of the
Patriotic Association of Kraja and Shoqata Ana e Malit, travel to
Montenegro to observe conditions in the Albanian majority
communities of Ulqin, Ana e Malit, Kraja, Tuzi, and Plave-Guci.
Joe DioGuardi speaks at the 90th commemoration of the death of
Albanian heroine Sulltana in Qafa, Macedonia. Cloyes and
DioGuardi meet in Prishtina with Azem Hajdini, a survivor of the
Tivar massacre in 1945, in which more than four thousand Albanians
were executed by the Serb and Montenegrin military.
October The Civic League brings a delegation to Rome for the beatification of
Mother Teresa at the Vatican and a visit to the Arberesh town of
Greci—the birthplace of DioGuardi’s father and home to the
descendants of Skanderbeg’s soldiers, who came to the Italian
peninsula in 1461 to fight the French on behalf of the Kingdom of
Naples.
The Congressional Human Rights Caucus, led by Congressman
Lantos, holds a hearing on “The Future of Albanians in Montenegro,”
at which Shirley Cloyes, Joe DioGuardi, Nail Draga, Anton Lajcaj,
and Xheladin Zeneli testify.
December The Civic League meets at UN headquarters with Congressman Ben
Gilman, President George Bush’s representative at the UN General
Assembly, and John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, to discuss the need for privatization, World Bank lending
and final status for Kosova.
2004
January The AACL executive board meets inside the U.S. Capitol Building on
the night of President Bush’s State of the Union Message. That day
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Congressmen Hyde and Lantos sent a revised “Dear Colleague” to all
435 members of the U.S. House of Representatives with H.Res. 28,
calling on the United States to declare its support for the
independence of Kosova now.
February DioGuardi and Cloyes travel to Toronto, at the request of the
Albanian community there, to help create a lobbying effort to
introduce a bill like H.Res. 28 in the Canadian parliament.
March Cloyes’s comment on Western foreign policy towards Serbia is
published in the Financial Times of London.
On March 17, the Civic League officially launches the International
Campaign for the Independence of Kosova Now at a meeting with
Congressman Henry Hyde in Washington. An electronic petition
drive begins on the Civic League website.
(THE STORY OF HOW A CONGRESSMAN BECOMES A LOBBYIST FOR ALBANIANS)
"A STRONG MAN ON THE SIDE OF KOSOVA"
Based on an interview with Former Congressman Joe DioGuardi
By Bexhet Haliti and Agron Shala in Zeri (Prishtina, Kosova)
October 25, 2000
Zeri: Mr. DioGuardi, even though Albanians know you very well, let’s talk about the beginning of your activities in support of Albanians. How did you start your career, and when did your "struggle" in the United States in support of Albanians, in general, and of Kosovar Albanians, in particular, begin?
DioGuardi: WHEN I BEGAN SERVING AS A MEMBER OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1985, ALBANIANS DID NOT KNOW WHO I WAS
DioGuardi: I have to begin by talking about my career as a Congressman. I was elected to the U.S. Congress in November 1984. At that time, Albanians didn’t know me at all. My father was born in Italy in December 1913, in the province of Avellino (between Naples and Bari) in an Albanian-speaking village called Greci in Italian and Katundi in Albanian. Greci is one of the fifty-one Albanian-speaking, or "Arberesh," villages and towns in present-day Italy. In 1929, at the age of fifteen, my father came to New York to escape the Great Depression in southern Italy. He was poor and uneducated, but America is such a good country that it provided opportunity for work and success. Like many ethnic Albanians, my father worked very hard, and saved money in order to raise a family. In 1939, he married my mother, Grace Paperella, and she subsequently gave birth to three children. I was the eldest and was born in New York City on September 20, 1940. As a hardworking Albanian American immigrant, my father always pushed me to succeed and to accomplish important things—just as Albanians do today all over the world.
In April 1984, I decided to leave the business sector, where I had worked for more than twenty-two years as a Certified Public Accountant and partner in one of the world’s largest and most prestigious accounting firms, Arthur Andersen & Co. At the age of forty-three, I became a candidate for the U.S. Congress. Nobody was expecting me to be elected, because I had never been involved previously in politics. But, with the help of then-President Ronald Reagan and Vice-President George Bush, who campaigned with me, I ran a successful congressional campaign and won.
Then, on September 20, 1985, something very important happened to awaken me about my heritage. Some Irish Americans who had supported my run for office brought some Albanian friends to my first birthday party as a sitting Congressman, and they overheard my father speaking Albanian to his youngest sister. Extremely surprised, they asked me: "How is it that your father speaks Albanian?" I responded that I had Albanian blood, like other Arberesh Albanians living in Italy. They then told me: "We are Albanians from Kosova, and your father’s people probably left Kosova more than five hundred years ago. I was astonished and asked them to elaborate. They replied that, "Your father’s people fled the Ottoman Turks and sought asylum in Italy five hundred years ago. You are a special Albanian to us, because the Arberesh protected our culture and preserved our language, customs, and history from Ottoman and Slavic ethnic cleansing campaigns for more than five hundred years. Congressman, we need to talk to you about what is happening to your Albanian brothers and sisters in Kosova today."
I agreed to meet with a group of Albanians living in and near my district, and the next day twenty Albanians, originally from Kosova, came to my house in New York and spoke for hours about the history and politics of Kosova, a place that I had never heard of. Looking back, it seems almost incredible that I, along with the majority of Americans, knew nothing about Kosova. Out of 535 members of the U.S. Congress in 1985, I eventually discovered that only about a dozen had heard of Kosova and knew about the plight of the Albanian majority there.
After that meeting, I got really interested in my Albanian roots and began to avidly pursue information about Kosova. I first went to Congressman Tom Lantos, since we had worked closely together on many human rights issues, including the oppression of Tibetan monks in China, Blacks in South Africa, and Jews in the Soviet Union. He responded immediately and positively, saying, "I was born in Hungary and I know the Albanian people and their history well. I will work with you."
The first resolution that I introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as a congressman was in June 1986 in support of the human rights of Albanians in Kosova. I then asked my friend, Senator Bob Dole, to introduce the same Resolution in the U.S. Senate, which he did just a day after I submitted mine in the House. A year later, in the spring of 1987, Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic started his barbaric campaign against the Albanians of Kosova and made his notorious speech in Kosova Polje, blaming the Albanians for the calamities that had befallen Yugoslavia (just as Hitler made the Jews the scapegoats for the tragedies that befell post-Weimar Germany). This is why it was necessary to initiate more Congressional Resolutions, statements, and hearings in 1987 and 1988. These actions led to our great success in getting the support of more than a hundred congressmen to challenge the then anti-Albanian State Department policy in Washington and to educate the U.S. press about what was really happening in Kosova.
In November 1988, I narrowly lost my third election in a political ambush by the Democratic Party to regain the district that I had taken from them in 1985. But Albanians still wanted me to work on the Albanian cause. And so, with the support of many Albanians across the country who had supported me when I was a congressman, I founded the Albanian American Civic League in January 1989, so that our voice could still be heard in Washington and around the world.
DioGuardi: As I said before, American Albanians desperately wanted me to continue the work that I had begun in Washington, because conditions for Kosovar Albanians were worsening each day. Milosevic was becoming stronger politically, and, as a result, Kosova was invaded and completely occupied by the Serbian military and special police in March 1989. While it was necessary for us to organize many demonstrations in the United States and to introduce new resolutions in Congress, I decided to do something even more important for Kosova—I decided to go there! I was advised by many Albanians that there were tanks and armored vehicles on every street corner in Kosova, but that, if I did not go to Belgrade and Prishtina to take photos and get testimony from Albanian journalists, the U.S. government would never know what was really happening there. Milosevic was busy concealing from the international press all of his brutal actions against Albanians, and he was using his total control of the Yugoslav wire service, Tanjug, to lie about the true conditions in Kosova.
With the support of Congressmen Tom Lantos and Ben Gilman, I went to Belgrade and then to Prishtina in November 1989. The U.S. State Department knew nothing about my visit until my plane landed in Belgrade. Congressman Lantos notified then-U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman that I had arrived in Serbia. He immediately got agitated and said that I should neither stay in Belgrade nor proceed to Kosova. (Lantos had intentionally not notified the State Department in advance of my trip, because they would have prevented it.) Nevertheless, I was already on my way to the Intercontinental Hotel in Belgrade, and eventually Ambassador Zimmerman phoned to arrange a meeting. I explained to him the reasons for my trip and why I felt that it was necessary to witness firsthand the conditions of the Serbian occupation of Kosova and to report back to Congress. He told me that it was dangerous for me to be in Belgrade and that I should immediately return to the United States. I responded that I refused to return without first meeting the Serbian and international press in Belgrade.
I then invited the media to the Intercontinental Hotel. The Serbian director of the hotel told me that, if I were going to hold a press conference there, he would be fired from his job. To avoid a confrontation with him, I went to my hotel room and phoned representatives of the foreign media and the Serbian press and invited them to join me at the International Press Building in the center of Belgrade. More than twenty journalists came to the press conference. They asked me about my trip and why the U.S. Congress had sent me. I distributed a letter signed by Congressmen Lantos and Gilman stating that I was representing them in Belgrade, because they could not be there at the time. I also gave the journalists copies of recent articles against Milosevic and his brutal actions in Kosova from the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. It was clear to me that they had not seen them and that Milosevic censored the truth by preventing the U.S. media from reaching Belgrade.
After that, against the wishes of the State Department, I decided to go to Prishtina. The Yugoslavian Secret Service sent an agent to escort me on the plane and around Kosova.
The agent was fluent Albanian, English, and Serbo-Croatian, and he ostensibly came with me to act as an interpreter. I checked in at the Grand Hotel in Prishtina, and again I was informed that I would not be allowed to hold a press conference. This is why I decided to stand in the street in front of the hotel and to invite the media to join me there, in front of the tanks. In the confusion of the moment, I got away with this action, and I recorded this historic confrontation with photographs and an audiotape for Congressmen Gilman and Lantos.
HAD OUR ‘LOBBYING’ CAMPAIGN FOR KOSOVA NOT STARTED IN 1989, TODAY KOSOVA WOULD BE LIKE CHECHNYA, WITH FEW AMERICANS UNDERSTANDING OR CARING ABOUT IT….
DioGuardi: When I came back to Washington from Kosova, I reported my experience and impressions to Congressmen Lantos and Gilman. I showed them my photos of the tanks on the streets of Prishtina, and I also showed them the photographs of Serbian brutality that I had obtained from Zenun Celaj and Zekaria Cana. Lantos and Gilman were shocked at what they heard and saw. Lantos told me that Kosova reminded him of Nazi Germany and the concentration camps, which he, his siblings, and his parents, Jews in Hungary during World War II, had managed to escape. I begged Lantos, in particular, to do something, because at that time the U.S. Congress was in the hands of the Democrats, and he therefore had the power to act that I lacked as a junior member of the minority Republican Party. I also asked him to come with me to Kosova, which he readily agreed to do in May 1990.
After I returned from Belgrade and Prishtina, and before I returned to Kosova with Tom Lantos six months later, the Albanian American Civic League brought to the United States fifteen representatives from Kosova, including Ibrahim Rugova, Rexhep Qosja, Anton Ceta, Luljeta Pula, Hajrullah Gorani, Idriz Ajeti, Marc Krasniqi, Veton Surroi, and others. At that time, the West knew almost nothing about Ibrahim Rugova. The Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) had not yet been formed, and Rugova was known only as a political activist and professor of literature. The Civic League took this delegation of Kosovar Albanians to Washington on April 24, 1990, to testify before Congress. We organized such a great hearing that the Serbs were worried and tried to prevent it from happening, but they did not succeed. (RUGOVA LATER BECAME PRESIDENT OF KOSOVA).
As a countervailing measure, the Serbs brought their leading philosopher on Serb nationalism, Dobrica Cosic, high-level representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and other prominent Serbs to the hearing in Washington in an effort to try to confuse the issue of Kosova. The hearing was conducted by Congressmen Tom Lantos and John Porter, the cochairmen of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. They reserved the largest hearing room on Capitol Hill. Albanians filled one side of the room, with more than a thousand more forced to wait patiently outside for three hours until the hearing ended, and the Serbs sat on the other side. Our friends, Congressmen Lantos, Gilman, Porter, Broomfield, and Hank Brown and Senators Dole and Pell, were present. On the other side, Helen Bentley, the Serbian American Congressman tried to interrupt and confuse all of the good testimony on behalf of Kosova. But Lantos, a great friend of mine and of all Albanians, allowed me to testify and then to cochair the hearing, even though I was no longer a Member of the U.S. Congress. This made it possible for all Albanian witnesses to be heard without interruption and to be asked many important questions that exposed the terrible human rights violations in Kosova and the brutality of the Serbian Communist regime headed by Slobodan Milosevic. Congressman Lantos was so impressed with all that he heard at this hearing that he agreed, at my urging, to come with me to Kosova in May 1990.
A month later, in Kosova, Lantos and I were greeted by tens of thousands of Albanians in front of the Grand Hotel in Prishtina with hugs, flowers, and cries of "USA" and "Long Live Democracy." This was the first big step that the Civic League took for Kosova, but, since then, we have never stopped working for Kosova and the Albanian national cause. From Kosova, Lantos and I traveled to Albania. Even though the Communist regime of Ramiz Alia did not welcome us with open arms, we felt that it was necessary to go there to put pressure on the Communists to open Albania to democracy.
For the next eleven years, I would work constantly as a strong voice for the Albanian people, and, since the end of 1993, when I met my wife, Shirley, a U.S. publisher and author, she has been a partner in this effort. In February 1998, when the Serbian military attacked Drenice, Shirley, through her connections with CNN and other media, helped bring international attention to the plight of Kosovar Albanians. In August 1998, during the Serbian summer offensive, she and I went to the front lines. When the NATO bombing campaign began in March 1999, Shirley and I continued our fight for Kosova as spokespersons for the Albanian cause on CNN, Fox News, ABC, NPR, BBC, and many other television and radio networks in the United States and throughout the world. We were well received as qualified experts on Kosova. Our web site also brought us to the attention of the media, academics, and journalists across the globe. In June 1999, National Geographic magazine asked us to collaborate with them on a major, thirty-five-page article on the Albanian people, which was subsequently published in February 2000, under the title of "Albanians: A People Undone."
Thus, the Civic League, Shirley, and I have never stopped working for Kosova, and our work has had many facets and entailed strategies that have been implemented in both Washington and in the Balkans. Had the Civic League not continued my work as a congressman on behalf of the Albanian national cause in 1989 and persisted in our lobbying, diplomatic efforts, and media campaign for Kosova until now, Kosova would be like Chechnya today, with few Americans understanding or caring about it, and, consequently, the Russians were able to kill with impunity tens of thousands of Chechnyans. The Chechnyan people had never previously made public who they were and what was happening to them, as we have done in relation to Kosova since I submitted the first Congressional Resolution in 1986. As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin was able to blame everything on the Chechnyans and got away with mass killing and destruction. On top of this, Putin was able to use his military offensive against the Chechnyan people to his political advantage with the ill-informed and misled Russian people, who elected him president in the wake of the destruction of Chechnya.
WE HAVE RAISED OUR VOICE ON KOSOVA IN THE UNITED STATES AND WILL NOT STOP UNTIL KOSOVA GAINS ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM SERBIA….
Beginning with my work as a congressman in 1985 and later as the volunteer president of the Albanian American Civic League, the Albanian people have made great friends in Washington and all over the world. This is why Slobodan Milosevic had to think many times before waging war in Kosova. He made a great mistake when he attacked Slovenia and Croatia, and he committed his worst atrocities in Bosnia, killing more than 300,000 and displacing two million. But, as we had warned our friends in Congress all along, Milosevic was preparing to implement his worst offensive, his plan for Albanian genocide, which began at the end of February 1998.
Ibrahim Rugova should have seen what was coming, when Bosnia was attacked in the early 1990s. He should have used the international prominence that the Civic League had gained for him, and prepared the Kosovar Albanians for what lay ahead, but he did not. Instead, we have the Kosova Liberation Army (UCK) to thank for coming to the defense of the Albanian people. I believe that Rugova made a terrible mistake by not supporting UCK, and for a time his actions threatened the defense of the civilian population in Kosova and caused great confusion in the United States.
But since NATO drove out the Serbian army, there is a new era of democracy in Kosova, and Albanians hold the keys to their future. Shirley and I made our fourth trip to Kosova since the end of the war on October 25, 2000, to observe the election process and then report back to Congressman Ben Gilman. The U.S. Congress was worried that there might be a repetition of what had happened in the elections in Albania on October 1, 2000, where there were many complaints about voter manipulation. This is why Shirley and I went to observe the elections in Kosova, and we were delighted to report back to Congressman Gilman, as chairman of the House International Relations Committee, that
the elections in Kosova were conducted according to the highest Western standards and with massive voter participation. The lack of violence before and during the local elections in Kosova demonstrated to the world how mature Kosovar Albanians are and that they deserve independence. I am convinced that these first elections will produce good leaders. What also impressed me was that there were many candidates to choose from. It is good that voters had many qualified people from which to choose as their local leaders. This was a great election for Kosova, and it earned the respect and admiration of many world leaders.
Zeri: The Serbs have said that you are the cause of all the problems that Serbia has with the United States. In what ways have the Serbs tried to stop your activities in the United States?
DioGuardi: Milosevic’s barbaric actions caused Serbia to lose any respect it may have had in the United States. Americans saw what the Serbs did to innocent Bosnian and Albanian civilians. When the world saw what Milosevic did to maintain his power, the Serbs lost many of their friends around the world. Among those who did not abandon the Serbs were people from the Greek lobby in the United States. There has been a kind of pan-Orthodox partnership among the Serbs, Russians, and Greeks. The Greek lobby in Washington was powerful under the Clinton administration, and they tried to create misinformation and confusion about Albanians concerns and interests. There are at least a dozen Greek Americans in the U.S. Congress, and, until a few years ago, Helen Bentley, a Serb-American, was a member of the House of Representatives. The Greeks, Serbs, and Russians created problems for us. They spread the propaganda that DioGuardi was a radical and that he exaggerates everything. In this way, they tried, and continue to try, to put obstacles in our way. (It is interesting to note that while the Greek lobby was telling the State Department that I was a radical who threatened the prospects for peace in the Balkans, they were saying nice things about Ibrahim Rugova. They referred to him approvingly as a "moderate" leader, since he had never used the word "independence," only the word "self-determination"—which many of us felt was a code word for "autonomy.")
The Albanian people want their independence, and the Civic League will never compromise the issue of independence for Kosova. This fact has always disturbed the Greeks and their allies, because they want to dominate and control the Albanian people in the Balkans. This is why they support the Socialist government and helped to remove the democratic regime of Dr. Sali Berisha. Just after Berisha made it clear that he was going to support the independence of Kosova, the Greek lobby in the United States brought Gramoz Pashko to work with them in Washington to overthrow the Berisha government.
They managed to convince the State Department that Berisha was a person who could not be kept under control. Thus, with the help of their friend Fatos Nano, who was also the leader of the Socialist Party in Albania, they were able to create a puppet government in Albania. I am afraid that Greece still wants to use its influence to keep Kosova under Serbia. This is why the Civic League must work harder than ever before.
Now, I would also like to mention something unfortunate, which may
even shock you. In the United States, there are some Albanians who can be
easily influenced by our adversaries, whether through ignorance or for
personal gain. This is why during the first ten years of the existence of the
Civic League we had people who left the organization. The Civic League is an
independent voice for the Albanian national cause. We do not represent the
concerns of political parties; we represent the concerns of the Albanian people.
Zeri: You registered the Albanian American Civic League as a lobby in Washington in 1989. What was the League when it was formed, and what is it now?
THE NEW CIVIC LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP CARD SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTS THE NATIONAL CONCERNS OF ALL ALBANIANS BY DISPLAYING THE ALBANIAN EAGLE OVER ALL THE ALBANIAN LANDS IN THE BALKANS….
DioGuardi: In 1989, our agenda was 100 percent devoted to Kosova, because this was the main Albanian problem, and Kosova was being turned into a nightmare before our eyes. During these early years, we managed to educate the U.S. Congress and the media about the brutal occupation of Kosova by Serbia’s Communist regime led by Slobodan Milosevic. Later, working with Shirley, we convinced more and more people about the righteousness of our cause in Kosova, especially during the NATO bombing campaign. Today, the Civic League has a broad agenda, encompassing all Albanian issues. Nevertheless, Kosova remains a priority for us, because we believe that its independence is the solution to all of the national problems that Albanians face outside of Kosova as well.
On our Civic League membership cards, you will see the Albanian eagle positioned on top of all ethnic Albanian lands--Kososva, southeast Montenegro, western Macedonia, northern Greece (Chameria), southern Serbia (Presheva, Medvegja, and Bujanoc), and Albania—the regions where Albanians live side by side. Because of Serbian and Greek propaganda, most people do not know anything about the unjust political division of seven million Albanians in the Balkans, which placed 3.5 million Albanians inside the State of Albania and 3.5 million outside.
The Civic League’s membership card drives the Greek and Serbian chauvinists crazy. They send threatening and defamatory letters, and they accuse us of supporting a "Greater Albania." Our response has been that we fight for the human and national rights of all Albanians, who are one nation and one people, even though they do not live, and may never live again, in the same state. Even Pope John Paul II supported this view. On the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, he said that the UN had accomplished a great deal on behalf of individual rights in the half century since its founding, but he then urged the UN to do the same for the rights of nations. He did not use the word "state," but "nations." This is why seven million Albanians in the Balkans must be respected as one nation of people and, to insure this, Kosova must become independent. Without the guarantee of statehood for Kosova, there will always be problems for Albanians all over the Balkans.
On the front of the Civic League membership card you will find the Albanian eagle on one side and the American eagle on the other, symbolizing the partnership between Albanians and the United States. This partnership needs to be made even stronger than it already is. Ever since President Woodrow Wilson protected the nation of Albania from dismemberment at the hands of the so-called Great Powers, U.S. foreign policy has shown Albanians that they can only trust Americans. So, to conclude on this question, the Civic League started out as a lobby for Kosova and then became a lobby for all Albanians in the Balkans.
Zeri: You have been to Kosova many times. In May 1990, you came with Congressman Tom Lantos. You have talked about how you were welcomed by Albanians at that time. Can you describe Kosova then and how you see it today?
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1990 AND NOW IS VERY SIGNIFICANT….
DioGuardi: When Shirley and I returned to Kosova after the war, in August 1999, it was almost ten years since my first trip with Tom Lantos. I immediately noticed very great changes. In 1990, the Serbian armed forces and special police were present everywhere. Tom Lantos and I were shocked when we saw how people were beaten in front of our eyes for simply trying to congregate in order to hear us speak. In 1999, Shirley and I saw all of the destruction and devastation wrought by the Serb army and paramilitaries, and we knew that at least ten thousand people had been killed and thousands more were still missing. But we also saw the smiles on the faces of all who had returned and we saw the determination to rebuild Kosova as quickly as possible.
We made two more trips to Kosova at the end of 1999, in October and November. Now, a year later, we are here again, and we see great improvements. Most of the badly damaged homes have been reconstructed, not by the UN, but by Albanians themselves.
As I said earlier, we have observed the municipal elections, and we are impressed by how well the process functioned.
While the difference between 1990 and the present is very significant, we should not forget how much the Albanian people suffered during the occupation. Not only were innocent people killed, but all of their jobs were taken from them and given to Serbs. Many were imprisoned, and most families did not know how they would survive from day to day and whom they could trust. These were terrible years, and only the great will power and positive energy of the Kosovars enabled them to survive. It is obvious to me that while fifty years of communism weakened the spirit of the Albanian people in Albania, the Albanians of Kosova maintained their individual and national spirit and optimism. This is why an independent Kosova is necessary even for Albania, which needs its national spirit reenergized, its economy strengthened, and its people put on the road to western-style democracy once and for all. A free, democratic, and independent Kosova will accomplish this.
Zeri: You are the sponsor of many Congressional Resolutions and other U.S. House and Senate actions on Kosova. How much influence did these actions have on U.S. foreign policy for Kosova? Why was it important to have Congressional Resolutions, floor statements, and hearings in the U.S. Congress?
DioGuardi: In the early years, every resolution and Congressional action met with difficulty, because Congresswoman Helen Bentley worked hard to block them. This forced us to think strategically in order to pass resolutions and to arrange hearings. Thanks to great friends, like Senator Bob Dole and Congressmen Ben Gilman and Tom Lantos, we succeeded on many occasions, and also in spite of the U.S. State Department opposition to any official actions in relation to Kosova.
The Bush and Clinton administrations made great mistakes under Secretaries of State Baker and Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke. It was a signal from James Baker in 1991 that Milosevic took as a green light to do whatever he liked to keep Yugoslavia alive. Later, in 1995, it was a signal from Richard Holbrooke, who brought Milosevic to the negotiating table at Dayton without any Albanian representation, which brought about the war in Kosova. And this is why the Albanian American Civic League, along with thousands of Albanians, demonstrated in front of Holbrooke’s offices in New York, saying to him, "You are becoming a new Neville Chamberlain. You say that there is peace, but there is none for Albanians, and now you have made an agreement with the devil, Slobodan Milosevic." Under these circumstances, with the State Department trying at all costs to keep Yugoslavia together, it became very difficult to pass resolutions in Congress in support of Kosova’s right to self-determination and independence from Serbia.
But, why were the resolutions important, even though they did not pass and did not guarantee anything for Albanians? Because each time we introduced a Congressional
Resolution, it gave us an opportunity to put the facts and our appeals for justice on paper, and to show the State Department that the Congress was watching its activity. The U.S. government is great, because the executive and the legislative branches balance each other. And since the legislative branch controls the funds for the State Department and has oversight responsibility for its activities, this puts pressure on the State Department and other executive branch officials to respond more favorably to Congressional action pushed by our Civic League.
Zeri: How did it happen that the Jewish lobby sided with the Albanian lobby on behalf of Kosova?
DioGuardi: Knowing how power works in Washington, I knew that if I complained directly to the State Department about the plight of Albanians in the Balkans without the support of key congressmen, they would never believe me. Instead, they would listen to the Greek lobby and their powerful friends, like Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Eagleburger, who knew Milosevic from the time he was a banker in Belgrade. So it was necessary to get the attention of the State Department through our Jewish American friends in and outside of Congress. There are thirty-four Jewish members of the House and Senate, and it was necessary to enlist their help by demonstrating to them that Albanians were their friends and protectors during World War II, when Albania was the only occupied country that saved its own Jewish population and every Jew who fled there. Albania was the only country where not a single Jew was surrendered to the Nazis, and it was the only country in Europe that had more Jews after the war than before it. We did this by distributing ten thousand copies of Rescue in Albania, which was written by Harvey Sarner, a Jewish American philanthropist, and prepared from information received by Congressman Lantos and me on our trip to Albania in 1990. Lantos and another great Jewish American congressman, Ben Gilman, wrote forewords to the book at the request of the Civic League. This book had a lot to do with bringing the Jewish lobby on our side.
We also distributed "The Expulsion of the Albanians" by Vaso Cubrilovic, a paper that was published in Belgrade in 1937, two years before the Nazis issued the memorandum on the "final solution" for exterminating European Jewry. It outlined a plan for ridding Kosova of its Albanian majority through mass expulsion and extermination. With the Jewish community on our side, the Civic League gained great impetus in our fight against the complicity of the State Department, which, in the early 1990s, wanted to cover up what was really going on in Bosnia and Kosova.
Zeri: In 1990, political parties, beginning with LDK, began to be organized in Kosova. They immediately started to create chapters or branches in the United States and Europe. How much damage did this cause the Albanian lobby in Washington by dividing Albanian Americans and diverting support from the Albanian American Civic League?
DioGuardi: When I went to Kosova for the first time in November 1989, there were no political parties. There was a movement for democracy, and Dr. Rugova was leading the Albanian people of Kosova in their struggle against communism. Hundreds of thousands of Albanians were encouraged to burn their Communist party membership cards in huge bonfires after the Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989. When I met Rugova in his office by the soccer stadium in Prishtina, he was not representing a party. He was a leader for democracy, and this is why we supported him and invited him to Washington and New York in April 1990.
I remember that in late 1990, Ali Aliu, Alush Gashi, and other Kosovars came to the United States and Canada to create branches of LDK, but they did not discuss this with me. They did this behind my back, using the connections that they had gotten through the Civic League. I had brought Ali Aliu to Chicago in June 1990, and months later my supporters there told me that he was speaking against supporting the Albanian American Civic League, saying that Albanians did not need the Civic League anymore, because they now had their own political party and should work to strengthen LDK. "Joe, they are trying to replace our lobby with a Party from Kosova," my friends told me. But, regrettably, I didn’t believe them, until 1992, when Alush Gashi and some members of the Civic League Board of Directors told me that I should resign as president and that LDK would then pay me to be the voice of the Party in Washington. I was so angry at this suggestion that I cursed these betrayers of the Albanian lobby and abruptly left them sitting at a table in Bruno’s restaurant in New York City. (Several members of the Civic League Board resigned at this time in order to spend their time and money supporting LDK, which served their personal interests in the United States and their captive families in Kosova. Later they established a competing group called the National Albanian American Council.)
This brings up the question that some people have asked about why some of the original Civic League Board members quit supporting Joe DioGuardi. One reason this happened is that some of Rugova’s people convinced them that LDK was more important than the Civic League. I told them that if they wanted to create political parties, they were free to do so, but that they still needed a strong lobby in the United States. I said further that political parties belonged in Kosova, not in the United States, and that the Civic League belonged in America and should be supported here, not interfered with. But LDK opportunists and careerists were more interested in maintaining their positions in the Party and in raising money for LDK than in creating a strong international voice for Kosova.
The consequences of this divisive behavior in America were revealed later. Had LDK worked with me to strengthen our Albanian lobby in Washington, I am convinced that Milosevic would have been stopped before the Dayton Accords allowed him to believe that he could get away with genocide in Kosova, as he already had in Bosnia. I truly believe that Rugova and other LDK officials made a big mistake in abandoning the Civic
League, after the League had spent so much time and money to bring them to the United States, to open up doors in Congress, and to organize contacts with so many influential people in Washington. They were naïve to think that I was simply going to resign and to turn over the lobby to people who pretended to speak for Kosova, but who were only acting out of their self-interest.
While I did not tell Albanian Americans to abandon LDK, I told them not to forget to support the Civic League. But many LDK supporters in America did not understand that they needed to back the lobby for things that LDK was not qualified to do, especially in Washington, where I, as a former U.S. congressman could, did, and still do accomplish a lot for Kosova.
Albanians from Macedonia initially followed the same pattern in America with the encouragement of LDK. But later they solved the problem by eliminating the U.S. branches of PDP. Arben Xhaferi came to America in February1995 with Iljaz Halimi, Ismet Ramadani, and Fadil Sulejmani, and together they signed a statement that branches of political parties and other associations from Macedonia would be disbanded in the United States. This left only LDK with branches in America. Today LDK is very weak, because its failure to back the Kosova Liberation Army leading up to and during the NATO war alienated many of its former members and supporters. When the LDK leadership realized too late that they were losing support to UCK, they abandoned the organization and reemerged on the Board of the National Albanian American Council. This is why many Albanians refer to NAAC-LDK as one entity. (You can easily see for yourself by comparing the current Board of the National Albanian American Council with the list of former leaders and key financial supporters of LDK—it’s almost the same!)
Zeri: What was and is the level of cooperation among Albanians in the United States?
DioGuardi: Albanians from six Balkan political jurisdictions (Albania, Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Presheva, and Chameria) live in the United States and they each have their own thoughts about what they think is the best way to politically represent their families in the Balkans. This is why it is very difficult to create a united voice for Albanians in America. We still have problems with Albanian officials coming to America as representatives of Kosovar and Albanian political parties that do not work with our lobby in Washington. They have even tried to create another lobby by putting some people in Washington as paid agents. But this only serves to confuse U.S. officials and to weaken our voice for Kosova, in particular. Before the NATO war, this allowed some State Department officials, such as Richard Holbrooke, to think that Albanians would accept "substantial autonomy" instead of independence, which the Civic League had been calling for since 1989. We have never compromised on the sovereign status of Kosova.
Zeri: Are you talking about National Albanian American Council?
DioGuardi: Yes, I am. I do not know what the National Albanian American Council actually tells the State Department, but, before the war, they led the State Department to believe that they could count on some Albanians to settle for something less than full independence for Kosova from Serbia. This follows in the footsteps of the LDK representatives who frequently came to Washington before the war, but who never asked for independence. Needless to say, this represents a big problem for the Albanian national cause. For this reason, we do not cooperate with NAAC, and also because they were formed with the expressed purpose of undermining our lobby—a goal that they will never achieve because we have friends in Washington and many supporters in America and around the world.
The other problem is that NAAC represents people from Albania who support Fatos Nano, someone that I could never support. He is not only against the independence of Kosova, but he is a puppet for Greek foreign policy for Albanians in Kosova, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Presheva, and Chameria. Some of the NAAC Board members are wealthy businessmen who support the Nano government because they want to protect their properties in Albania and have no problem supporting the former Communists. This conflict complicates our work and, together with Shirley Cloyes, I have had to redouble our efforts in Washington and in seeking support throughout the United States. Shirley and I are not paid; we are volunteers. But we collect money to fund the activities of the lobby in New York and Washington. The Civic League has many independent-thinking supporters who will never support the Nano government in Albania and who will never abandon independence for Kosova. I hope that, after the November 2001 elections in Kosova, Albanian leaders will be wise enough to sit down and decide that the Civic League—led by a former U.S. congressman with Albanian blood, and his wife, a writer and former publisher, both of whom work incessantly as volunteers for the Albanian national cause—is the best voice for Kosova in Washington.
Zeri: What is your experience in the United States as an uncompromising fighter for the Albanian national cause, particularly for Kosova?
DioGuardi: Unfortunately, with Milosevic, there was no other solution than war. And, thanks to the KLA, a defensive force of freedom fighters, the Albanians of Kosova had an army that protected the people, their lives, and their property. The United States acted the same way during the American Revolution. The bottom line is that if you do not stand up for your freedom, nobody is going to give it to you.
I had always thought that a war in Kosova would take place, because Milosevic was on a quest for "Greater Serbia," while he was accusing Albanians of planning for a "Greater Albania." But Albanians did not have the power to create a Greater Albania. They did not have a big army, or an atomic bomb. But Milosevic’s propaganda misled the Serbian people, and he proceeded to wage war for ten years across the Balkans. If there had been no war in Kosova, Holbrooke would probably have gotten away with making a false peace with Milosevic in October 1998. (This was when he made the flimsy "October agreement" with Milosevic, which allowed international monitors into Kosova and mandated the withdrawal of Serbian military forces--something that Milosevic never intended to do.) This one-sided agreement, if implemented, would have been the beginning of the end for the Albanian national cause, because Kosova would then never have had the chance to become independent.
Shirley and I went to Rambouillet in February 1999 to tell Hashim Thaci not to sign the agreement. We believed in what Adem Demaci said at that time—that if Albanian leaders signed a paper that said the Kosova was a part of Serbia, it would be used against them in the future. As it turned out, Milosevic refused to sign the agreement anyway, and this garnered world sympathy and U.S. support for Kosovar Albanians, leading to a new opportunity to achieve freedom for Kosova. Today, we must work hard to convince the international community, especially the United States, that without independence, there will never be peace and stability in the Balkans, and Europe will be constantly in turmoil as a result.
Zeri: At the time of the NATO bombing campaign, you sent a letter to President Bill Clinton, asking for the immediate deployment of ground troops and the arming of the KLA. Were you afraid at the time that air strikes might be unsuccessful?
DioGuardi: I was very concerned that air attacks would kill a lot of innocent civilians. President Clinton did a good job in ordering air strikes, but history will show that he was reluctant to do it and that he waited too long. The United States should have confronted Milosevic earlier in Bosnia. But Clinton looked the other way when more than 300,000 Bosnians were killed, and he almost did the same in Kosova.
When the bombs started to fall against the Serbian forces invading Kosova, we witnessed the massive expulsion of the Albanian population, civilian massacres, and the wanton destruction of Kosovar Albanian homes and property. This is why we told President Clinton that if he was afraid of the political consequences of losing American soldiers, he should arm Albanian freedom fighters—the KLA. The U.S. government had secretly armed the Croatians, and this is why the Serbian military suffered damages in Bosnia and were driven out of the Krajina in September 1995. In June 1999, we got a Congressional Resolution sponsored in the House by Congressman Jim Traficant and the Senate by Senator Joseph Lieberman in support of arming the KLA, but a peace agreement was signed shortly thereafter that made this unnecessary. Perhaps Milosevic realized that the KLA was going to be armed and that General Wesley Clark was pushing hard to deploy the ground troops that were based in Macedonia and Albania. It is obvious to all now that conducting air strikes without deploying ground troops was a very inefficient way to stop the war. It led to the death of many innocent civilians, destroyed much property, and allowed Milosevic to displace almost a million people, creating one of the largest refugee crises since World War II.
Zeri: You came again to Kosova, but this time to observe local elections. What is your opinion about the pre-election campaign and the electoral process? Have Albanians demonstrated that they deserve national elections in Kosova?
DioGuardi: Having followed the elections in Kosova closely, I congratulate the Albanian people for their disciplined behavior and their respect for the rule of law. This demonstrates to the international community that Kosova is ready for a democratic society and for self-governance. Comparing the problems that I saw during the elections in Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, and other Balkan countries, the Albanians of Kosova deserve great praise for their peaceful participation in the local election process in October 2000.
Shirley and I have followed the campaigns of the major political parties, in particular, and they all realize that democratic elections are the starting point to the process of self-government and, ultimately, statehood. We would like to see leaders who are ready to demonstrate to the world that Albanians in Kosova are ready to solve problems, such as security, unemployment, sanitation, environmental pollution, crime, and corruption. This will speed up the process of democratizing Kosova and then of solidifying international support for the independence of Kosova.
Zeri: Bush has stated that if he is elected president, he will withdraw American troops from the Balkans. How will the election of George W. Bush impact Kosova?
NO MATTER WHO WINS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE HAS FRIENDS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE….
DioGuardi: Every election in the United States is important, because of America’s huge impact on world developments. Though the Republicans have a small advantage, the result will be very close and cannot be predicted. The good news is that Albanians have friends on both sides of the political spectrum. Whoever becomes the president and the vice president of the Untied States, Shirley and I will go to Washington to continue to lobby the White House and the Congress for the independence of Kosova. And we must demonstrate that it will be in the self-interest of the United States to support the independence of Kosova, because the United States has even greater, more intractable, problems in the Middle East, China, and Africa. Since Albanians have demonstrated that they understand democracy and trust America, and that they are prepared to create a democratic Kosova, the United States should support the independence of Kosova as the key to peace and stability in the Balkans and, therefore, in Europe.
Zeri asked Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi to conclude the interview:
ALBANIANS—THE LARGEST DIVIDED NATION IN EUROPE
Zeri: Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi, you have greatly helped the Albanian American Civic League in its commitment to the Albanian national cause. Was this a sacrifice on your part?
Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Joe and I have been a team since we met at the end of 1993. One might say that we have sacrificed a lot, but this was our decision. It has been a privilege to work on bringing peace with justice to all Albanians in the Balkans, and especially because the resolution of the Albanian national cause, in my opinion, will determine the future for all of us, Albanian and non-Albanian alike.
The reason that Joe DioGuardi and I met was that I was the first book publisher in the United States to publish a book on the former Yugoslavia from the perspective of the anti-Milosevic forces inside the Balkans. At that time, people in the United States knew very little about Kosova. And, then, the information that they got was mostly from the British academy. This was the case because, for fifty years, Albania was isolated under Enver Hoxha, while Kosova was under the rule of Josip Tito. Throughout this period, the Slavs dominated the academy and the media in the United States and Western Europe. They had numerous people studying in America, working the in the media, and working against Albanians in Washington. Meanwhile, senior U.S. officials, such as Secretaries of State James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger had many contacts with Belgrade, and this is why there was little understanding of the Albanian reality. In fact, the Albanian reality was hidden, and, as a result, it was easy for Milosevic to rise to power in 1987 on a political platform of anti-Albanian racism.
When the war started and escalated in Bosnia, I was one of the main publishers of books on domestic and foreign policy in the United States. I, along with many Americans, watched in horror as images of atrocities from Bosnia-Hercegovina flashed across my television screen. But then, day after day, week after week, month after month, as the images multiplied on the screen, so too did the rationalizations from the U.S. government for its inaction. And my shock mounted when I suddenly realized that nothing was being done to stop the carnage inside the former Yugoslavia, that nothing was going to be done, and that in effect all of us were being forced to become complicit in it.
We were witnessing unspeakable acts of violence and then being told that this was "not our war," that there was nothing we could do about it, that it was a potential "quagmire" into which we would only venture at our peril, and that we could not possibly understand an outbreak of savagery that was rooted in "ancient hatreds." But, I responded that, "No, this is our war," and that if we did not stop Milosevic now, he would become a new Hitler. I believe strongly that we cannot take democracy and freedom for granted, that each generation has to wage the fight against fascism and ultra-nationalism. This is why I decided to publish a book that would enable Americans to understand the Balkan conflict from the perspective of the anti-Milosevic forces inside the former Yugoslavia.
The book included authors who were resisting Milosevic from Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and Macedonia. When I met Joe, he criticized me for not including any Albanian author in the book. It was through him and members of the Albanian American Civic League Board that I became educated about the Albanian dimension of the Balkan conflict. And, then, as is so often the case when an outsider comes in to a particular situation, he or she can cast a new light on it. Before I knew anything about the history of the Albanian national question, I grasped its import, and I came to call the Albanian nation "the largest divided nation in Europe and the largest invisible minority in the United States."
Zeri: After the NATO air strikes in Kosova, you did not stop your activity in support of Kosova and the Albanian national question. In September 1999, you authored a public declaration about the solution of the Albanian national issue, and you mentioned the problems that still confront Kosova today, including the issue of Serbian war criminals, the partition of Mitrovice, the status of the Trepca mines, etc. What do you see as the solution for Kosova in the future?
Cloyes DioGuardi: It is a fact that the majority of the great problems in Kosova have not been resolved. But, this has very little to do with the Albanians of Kosova, because this must be solved, at least in the beginning, by the international community. The Kosovars, with their education, energy, and personal sacrifice have made a lot of progress in post-war Kosova. But, today, it is the obligation of the UN to administer Kosova and to solve the problems that are affecting daily life in Kosova. Let us take, for example, the Trepca mines and the fact that Mitrovice is still partitioned. During the war, Joe and I were the first spokespeople to mention the significance of the Trepca mines on CNN, Fox-TV, BBC, and other networks. Many commentators were asking at that time why Milosevic was so interested in Kosova. And we responded that, while Kuwait had oil, Kosova had incredible mineral deposits, including the chromium, gold, silver, and coal, in Trepca.
Then, there is the problem of the Serbian war criminals. We witnessed NATO withdrawing its military forces from Serbia and Kosova without insisting that the indicted Serbian war criminals be apprehended and extradicted to The Hague. Over and over, on internationally televised broadcasts, Joe and I said that there would be no solution in Kosova, if Milosevic and other indicted war criminals were not brought to justice in the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.
Equally important is the unresolved issue of the Albanian prisoners of war, who were illegally brought to Serbia at the end of the war, in violation of the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. government, regrettably, dropped from the Kumanova agreement that ended the war the provision that would have guaranteed the release of the Albanian POWs. This is why we demanded that the Clinton administration talk about this issue, especially to the Russians. While Bernard Kouchner did the right thing when he asked Serbian President Kostunica to immediately release the Albanian prisoners in Serbian jails, unfortunately, other countries, such as Greece and France, failed to support his demand.
Finally, I am pleased that much progress has been made in Kosova, but the progress would have been much greater if the UN Mission were replaced by an Albanian administration and retained only a supervisory role. Without a homegrown Albanian administration, we will always have major problems in Kosova. If we want real peace in the Balkans and in Europe, then we must continue to press the West for the independence of Kosova. We should not delay the resolution of the final status of Kosova, as the world has done with the Palestinian issue with predictable and devastating consequences. Joe and I have often reminded Washington that if the independence of Kosova is not recognized, a fifth Balkan war could be triggered. The latter can be avoided through intensive U.S. diplomatic intervention now, and this will require the Albanian American Civic League to continue its lobbying and media activities in Washington and around the world.
(original text without bold/underline can be found below)
"A STRONG MAN ON THE SIDE OF KOSOVA"
Based on an interview with Former Congressman Joe DioGuardi
by Bexhet Haliti and Agron Shala in Zeri (Prishtina, Kosova)
October 25, 2000
Zeri: Mr. DioGuardi, even though Albanians know you very well, let’s talk about the beginning of your activities in support of Albanians. How did you start your career, and when did your "struggle" in the United States in support of Albanians, in general, and of Kosovar Albanians, in particular, begin?
WHEN I BEGAN SERVING AS A MEMBER OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1985, ALBANIANS DID NOT KNOW WHO I WAS….
DioGuardi: I have to begin by talking about my career as a Congressman. I was elected to the U.S. Congress in November 1984. At that time, Albanians didn’t know me at all. My father was born in Italy in December 1913, in the province of Avellino (between Naples and Bari) in an Albanian-speaking village called Greci in Italian and Katundi in Albanian. Greci is one of the fifty-one Albanian-speaking, or "Arberesh," villages and towns in present-day Italy. In 1929, at the age of fifteen, my father came to New York to escape the Great Depression in southern Italy. He was poor and uneducated, but America is such a good country that it provided opportunity for work and success. Like many ethnic Albanians, my father worked very hard, and saved money in order to raise a family. In 1939, he married my mother, Grace Paperella, and she subsequently gave birth to three children. I was the eldest and was born in New York City on September 20, 1940. As a hardworking Albanian American immigrant, my father always pushed me to succeed and to accomplish important things—just as Albanians do today all over the world.
In April 1984, I decided to leave the business sector, where I had worked for more than twenty-two years as a Certified Public Accountant and partner in one of the world’s largest and most prestigious accounting firms, Arthur Andersen & Co. At the age of forty-three, I became a candidate for the U.S. Congress. Nobody was expecting me to be elected, because I had never been involved previously in politics. But, with the help of then-President Ronald Reagan and Vice-President George Bush, who campaigned with me, I ran a successful congressional campaign and won.
Then, on September 20, 1985, something very important happened to awaken me about my heritage. Some Irish Americans who had supported my run for office brought some Albanian friends to my first birthday party as a sitting Congressman, and they overheard my father speaking Albanian to his youngest sister. Extremely surprised, they asked me: "How is it that your father speaks Albanian?" I responded that I had Albanian blood, like other Arberesh Albanians living in Italy. They then told me: "We are Albanians from Kosova, and your father’s people probably left Kosova more than five hundred years ago. I was astonished and asked them to elaborate. They replied that, "Your father’s people fled the Ottoman Turks and sought asylum in Italy five hundred years ago. You are a special Albanian to us, because the Arberesh protected our culture and preserved our language, customs, and history from Ottoman and Slavic ethnic cleansing campaigns for more than five hundred years. Congressman, we need to talk to you about what is happening to your Albanian brothers and sisters in Kosova today."
I agreed to meet with a group of Albanians living in and near my district, and the next day twenty Albanians, originally from Kosova, came to my house in New York and spoke for hours about the history and politics of Kosova, a place that I had never heard of. Looking back, it seems almost incredible that I, along with the majority of Americans, knew nothing about Kosova. Out of 535 members of the U.S. Congress in 1985, I eventually discovered that only about a dozen had heard of Kosova and knew about the plight of the Albanian majority there.
After that meeting, I got really interested in my Albanian roots and began to avidly pursue information about Kosova. I first went to Congressman Tom Lantos, since we had worked closely together on many human rights issues, including the oppression of Tibetan monks in China, Blacks in South Africa, and Jews in the Soviet Union. He responded immediately and positively, saying, "I was born in Hungary and I know the Albanian people and their history well. I will work with you."
The first resolution that I introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as a congressman was in June 1986 in support of the human rights of Albanians in Kosova. I then asked my friend, Senator Bob Dole, to introduce the same Resolution in the U.S. Senate, which he did just a day after I submitted mine in the House. A year later, in the spring of 1987, Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic started his barbaric campaign against the Albanians of Kosova and made his notorious speech in Kosova Polje, blaming the Albanians for the calamities that had befallen Yugoslavia (just as Hitler made the Jews the scapegoats for the tragedies that befell post-Weimar Germany). This is why it was necessary to initiate more Congressional Resolutions, statements, and hearings in 1987 and 1988. These actions led to our great success in getting the support of more than a hundred congressmen to challenge the then anti-Albanian State Department policy in Washington and to educate the U.S. press about what was really happening in Kosova.
In November 1988, I narrowly lost my third election in a political ambush by the Democratic Party to regain the district that I had taken from them in 1985. But Albanians still wanted me to work on the Albanian cause. And so, with the support of many Albanians across the country who had supported me when I was a congressman, I founded the Albanian American Civic League in January 1989, so that our voice could still be heard in Washington and around the world.
Zeri: Are you talking about the time when Serbian tanks had invaded Kosova in 1989?
WHEN I CAME TO BELGRADE AND PRISHTINA IN NOVEMBER 1989, I
WAS ESCORTED BY A SOCALLED ALBANIAN TRANSLATOR, WHO, IN REALITY, WAS AN UDBA AGENT….
DioGuardi: As I said before, American Albanians desperately wanted me to continue the work that I had begun in Washington, because conditions for Kosovar Albanians were worsening each day. Milosevic was becoming stronger politically, and, as a result, Kosova was invaded and completely occupied by the Serbian military and special police in March 1989. While it was necessary for us to organize many demonstrations in the United States and to introduce new resolutions in Congress, I decided to do something even more important for Kosova—I decided to go there! I was advised by many Albanians that there were tanks and armored vehicles on every street corner in Kosova, but that, if I did not go to Belgrade and Prishtina to take photos and get testimony from Albanian journalists, the U.S. government would never know what was really happening there. Milosevic was busy concealing from the international press all of his brutal actions against Albanians, and he was using his total control of the Yugoslav wire service, Tanjug, to lie about the true conditions in Kosova.
With the support of Congressmen Tom Lantos and Ben Gilman, I went to Belgrade and then to Prishtina in November 1989. The U.S. State Department knew nothing about my visit until my plane landed in Belgrade. Congressman Lantos notified then-U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman that I had arrived in Serbia. He immediately got agitated and said that I should neither stay in Belgrade nor proceed to Kosova. (Lantos had intentionally not notified the State Department in advance of my trip, because they would have prevented it.) Nevertheless, I was already on my way to the Intercontinental Hotel in Belgrade, and eventually Ambassador Zimmerman phoned to arrange a meeting. I explained to him the reasons for my trip and why I felt that it was necessary to witness firsthand the conditions of the Serbian occupation of Kosova and to report back to Congress. He told me that it was dangerous for me to be in Belgrade and that I should immediately return to the United States. I responded that I refused to return without first meeting the Serbian and international press in Belgrade.
I then invited the media to the Intercontinental Hotel. The Serbian director of the hotel told me that, if I were going to hold a press conference there, he would be fired from his job. To avoid a confrontation with him, I went to my hotel room and phoned representatives of the foreign media and the Serbian press and invited them to join me at the International Press Building in the center of Belgrade. More than twenty journalists came to the press conference. They asked me about my trip and why the U.S. Congress had sent me. I distributed a letter signed by Congressmen Lantos and Gilman stating that I was representing them in Belgrade, because they could not be there at the time. I also gave the journalists copies of recent articles against Milosevic and his brutal actions in Kosova from the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. It was clear to me that they had not seen them and that Milosevic censored the truth by preventing the U.S. media from reaching Belgrade.
After that, against the wishes of the State Department, I decided to go to Prishtina. The Yugoslavian Secret Service sent an agent to escort me on the plane and around Kosova.
The agent was fluent Albanian, English, and Serbo-Croatian, and he ostensibly came with me to act as an interpreter. I checked in at the Grand Hotel in Prishtina, and again I was informed that I would not be allowed to hold a press conference. This is why I decided to stand in the street in front of the hotel and to invite the media to join me there, in front of the tanks. In the confusion of the moment, I got away with this action, and I recorded this historic confrontation with photographs and an audiotape for Congressmen Gilman and Lantos.
Zeri: What did you do next?
HAD OUR ‘LOBBYING’ CAMPAIGN FOR KOSOVA NOT STARTED IN 1989, TODAY KOSOVA WOULD BE LIKE CHECHNYA, WITH FEW AMERICANS UNDERSTANDING OR CARING ABOUT IT….
DioGuardi: When I came back to Washington from Kosova, I reported my experience and impressions to Congressmen Lantos and Gilman. I showed them my photos of the tanks on the streets of Prishtina, and I also showed them the photographs of Serbian brutality that I had obtained from Zenun Celaj and Zekaria Cana. Lantos and Gilman were shocked at what they heard and saw. Lantos told me that Kosova reminded him of Nazi Germany and the concentration camps, which he, his siblings, and his parents, Jews in Hungary during World War II, had managed to escape. I begged Lantos, in particular, to do something, because at that time the U.S. Congress was in the hands of the Democrats, and he therefore had the power to act that I lacked as a junior member of the minority Republican Party. I also asked him to come with me to Kosova, which he readily agreed to do in May 1990.
After I returned from Belgrade and Prishtina, and before I returned to Kosova with Tom Lantos six months later, the Albanian American Civic League brought to the United States fifteen representatives from Kosova, including Ibrahim Rugova, Rexhep Qosja, Anton Ceta, Luljeta Pula, Hajrullah Gorani, Idriz Ajeti, Marc Krasniqi, Veton Surroi, and others. At that time, the West knew almost nothing about Ibrahim Rugova. The Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) had not yet been formed, and Rugova was known only as a political activist and professor of literature. The Civic League took this delegation of Kosovar Albanians to Washington on April 24, 1990, to testify before
Congress. We organized such a great hearing that the Serbs were worried and tried to prevent it from happening, but they did not succeed.
As a countervailing measure, the Serbs brought their leading philosopher on Serb nationalism, Dobrica Cosic, high-level representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and other prominent Serbs to the hearing in Washington in an effort to try to confuse the issue of Kosova. The hearing was conducted by Congressmen Tom Lantos and John Porter, the cochairmen of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. They reserved the largest hearing room on Capitol Hill. Albanians filled one side of the room, with more than a thousand more forced to wait patiently outside for three hours until the hearing ended, and the Serbs sat on the other side. Our friends, Congressmen Lantos, Gilman, Porter, Broomfield, and Hank Brown and Senators Dole and Pell, were present. On the other side, Helen Bentley, the Serbian American Congressman tried to interrupt and confuse all of the good testimony on behalf of Kosova. But Lantos, a great friend of mine and of all Albanians, allowed me to testify and then to cochair the hearing, even though I was no longer a Member of the U.S. Congress. This made it possible for all Albanian witnesses to be heard without interruption and to be asked many important questions that exposed the terrible human rights violations in Kosova and the brutality of the Serbian Communist regime headed by Slobodan Milosevic. Congressman Lantos was so impressed with all that he heard at this hearing that he agreed, at my urging, to come with me to Kosova in May 1990.
A month later, in Kosova, Lantos and I were greeted by tens of thousands of Albanians in front of the Grand Hotel in Prishtina with hugs, flowers, and cries of "USA" and "Long Live Democracy." This was the first big step that the Civic League took for Kosova, but, since then, we have never stopped working for Kosova and the Albanian national cause. From Kosova, Lantos and I traveled to Albania. Even though the Communist regime of Ramiz Alia did not welcome us with open arms, we felt that it was necessary to go there to put pressure on the Communists to open Albania to democracy.
For the next eleven years, I would work constantly as a strong voice for the Albanian people, and, since the end of 1993, when I met my wife, Shirley, a U.S. publisher and author, she has been a partner in this effort. In February 1998, when the Serbian military attacked Drenice, Shirley, through her connections with CNN and other media, helped bring international attention to the plight of Kosovar Albanians. In August 1998, during the Serbian summer offensive, she and I went to the front lines. When the NATO bombing campaign began in March 1999, Shirley and I continued our fight for Kosova as spokespersons for the Albanian cause on CNN, Fox News, ABC, NPR, BBC, and many other television and radio networks in the United States and throughout the world. We were well received as qualified experts on Kosova. Our web site also brought us to the attention of the media, academics, and journalists across the globe. In June 1999, National Geographic magazine asked us to collaborate with them on a major, thirty-five-page article on the Albanian people, which was subsequently published in February 2000, under the title of "Albanians: A People Undone."
Thus, the Civic League, Shirley, and I have never stopped working for Kosova, and our work has had many facets and entailed strategies that have been implemented in both Washington and in the Balkans. Had the Civic League not continued my work as a congressman on behalf of the Albanian national cause in 1989 and persisted in our lobbying, diplomatic efforts, and media campaign for Kosova until now, Kosova would be like Chechnya today, with few Americans understanding or caring about it, and, consequently, the Russians were able to kill with impunity tens of thousands of Chechnyans. The Chechnyan people had never previously made public who they were and what was happening to them, as we have done in relation to Kosova since I submitted the first Congressional Resolution in 1986. As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin was able to blame everything on the Chechnyans and got away with mass killing and destruction. On top of this, Putin was able to use his military offensive against the Chechnyan people to his political advantage with the ill-informed and misled Russian people, who elected him president in the wake of the destruction of Chechnya.
WE HAVE RAISED OUR VOICE ON KOSOVA IN THE UNITED STATES AND WILL NOT STOP UNTIL KOSOVA GAINS ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM SERBIA….
Beginning with my work as a congressman in 1985 and later as the volunteer president of the Albanian American Civic League, the Albanian people have made great friends in Washington and all over the world. This is why Slobodan Milosevic had to think many times before waging war in Kosova. He made a great mistake when he attacked Slovenia and Croatia, and he committed his worst atrocities in Bosnia, killing more than 300,000 and displacing two million. But, as we had warned our friends in Congress all along, Milosevic was preparing to implement his worst offensive, his plan for Albanian genocide, which began at the end of February 1998.
Ibrahim Rugova should have seen what was coming, when Bosnia was attacked in the early 1990s. He should have used the international prominence that the Civic League had gained for him, and prepared the Kosovar Albanians for what lay ahead, but he did not. Instead, we have the Kosova Liberation Army (UCK) to thank for coming to the defense of the Albanian people. I believe that Rugova made a terrible mistake by not supporting UCK, and for a time his actions threatened the defense of the civilian population in Kosova and caused great confusion in the United States.
But since NATO drove out the Serbian army, there is a new era of democracy in Kosova, and Albanians hold the keys to their future. Shirley and I made our fourth trip to Kosova since the end of the war on October 25, 2000, to observe the election process and then report back to Congressman Ben Gilman. The U.S. Congress was worried that there might be a repetition of what had happened in the elections in Albania on October 1, 2000, where there were many complaints about voter manipulation. This is why Shirley and I went to observe the elections in Kosova, and we were delighted to report back to Congressman Gilman, as chairman of the House International Relations Committee, that the elections in Kosova were conducted according to the highest Western standards and with massive voter participation. The lack of violence before and during the local elections in Kosova demonstrated to the world how mature Kosovar Albanians are and that they deserve independence. I am convinced that these first elections will produce good leaders. What also impressed me was that there were many candidates to choose from. It is good that voters had many qualified people from which to choose as their local leaders. This was a great election for Kosova, and it earned the respect and admiration of many world leaders.
Zeri: The Serbs have said that you are the cause of all the problems that Serbia has with the United States. In what ways have the Serbs tried to stop your activities in the United States?
I HAVE SAID THAT I WILL NEVER COMPROMISE THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVA AND THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL CAUSE….
DioGuardi: Milosevic’s barbaric actions caused Serbia to lose any respect it may have had in the United States. Americans saw what the Serbs did to innocent Bosnian and Albanian civilians. When the world saw what Milosevic did to maintain his power, the Serbs lost many of their friends around the world. Among those who did not abandon the Serbs were people from the Greek lobby in the United States. There has been a kind of pan-Orthodox partnership among the Serbs, Russians, and Greeks. The Greek lobby in Washington was powerful under the Clinton administration, and they tried to create misinformation and confusion about Albanians concerns and interests. There are at least a dozen Greek Americans in the U.S. Congress, and, until a few years ago, Helen Bentley, a Serb-American, was a member of the House of Representatives. The Greeks, Serbs, and Russians created problems for us. They spread the propaganda that DioGuardi was a radical and that he exaggerates everything. In this way, they tried, and continue to try, to put obstacles in our way. (It is interesting to note that while the Greek lobby was telling the State Department that I was a radical who threatened the prospects for peace in the Balkans, they were saying nice things about Ibrahim Rugova. They referred to him approvingly as a "moderate" leader, since he had never used the word "independence," only the word "self-determination"—which many of us felt was a code word for "autonomy.")
The Albanian people want their independence, and the Civic League will never compromise the issue of independence for Kosova. This fact has always disturbed the Greeks and their allies, because they want to dominate and control the Albanian people in the Balkans. This is why they support the Socialist government and helped to remove the democratic regime of Dr. Sali Berisha. Just after Berisha made it clear that he was going to support the independence of Kosova, the Greek lobby in the United States brought Gramoz Pashko to work with them in Washington to overthrow the Berisha government.
They managed to convince the State Department that Berisha was a person who could not be kept under control. Thus, with the help of their friend Fatos Nano, who was also the leader of the Socialist Party in Albania, they were able to create a puppet government in Albania. I am afraid that Greece still wants to use its influence to keep Kosova under Serbia. This is why the Civic League must work harder than ever before.
Now, I would also like to mention something unfortunate, which may even shock you. In the United States, there are some Albanians who can be easily influenced by our adversaries, whether through ignorance or for personal gain. This is why during the first ten years of the existence of the Civic League we had people who left the organization. The Civic League is an independent voice for the Albanian national cause. We do not represent the concerns of political parties; we represent the concerns of the Albanian people.
Zeri: You registered the Albanian American Civic League as a lobby in Washington in 1989. What was the League when it was formed, and what is it now?
THE NEW CIVIC LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP CARD SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTS THE NATIONAL CONCERNS OF ALL ALBANIANS BY DISPLAYING THE ALBANIAN EAGLE OVER ALL THE ALBANIAN LANDS IN THE BALKANS….
DioGuardi: In 1989, our agenda was 100 percent devoted to Kosova, because this was
the main Albanian problem, and Kosova was being turned into a nightmare before our eyes. During these early years, we managed to educate the U.S. Congress and the media about the brutal occupation of Kosova by Serbia’s Communist regime led by Slobodan Milosevic. Later, working with Shirley, we convinced more and more people about the righteousness of our cause in Kosova, especially during the NATO bombing campaign. Today, the Civic League has a broad agenda, encompassing all Albanian issues. Nevertheless, Kosova remains a priority for us, because we believe that its independence is the solution to all of the national problems that Albanians face outside of Kosova as well.
On our Civic League membership cards, you will see the Albanian eagle positioned on top of all ethnic Albanian lands--Kososva, southeast Montenegro, western Macedonia, northern Greece (Chameria), southern Serbia (Presheva, Medvegja, and Bujanoc), and Albania—the regions where Albanians live side by side. Because of Serbian and Greek propaganda, most people do not know anything about the unjust political division of seven million Albanians in the Balkans, which placed 3.5 million Albanians inside the State of Albania and 3.5 million outside.
The Civic League’s membership card drives the Greek and Serbian chauvinists crazy. They send threatening and defamatory letters, and they accuse us of supporting a "Greater Albania." Our response has been that we fight for the human and national rights of all Albanians, who are one nation and one people, even though they do not live, and may never live again, in the same state. Even Pope John Paul II supported this view. On the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, he said that the UN had accomplished a great deal on behalf of individual rights in the half century since its founding, but he then urged the UN to do the same for the rights of nations. He did not use the word "state," but "nations." This is why seven million Albanians in the Balkans must be respected as one nation of people and, to insure this, Kosova must become independent. Without the guarantee of statehood for Kosova, there will always be problems for Albanians all over the Balkans.
On the front of the Civic League membership card you will find the Albanian eagle on one side and the American eagle on the other, symbolizing the partnership between Albanians and the United States. This partnership needs to be made even stronger than it already is. Ever since President Woodrow Wilson protected the nation of Albania from dismemberment at the hands of the socalled Great Powers, U.S. foreign policy has shown Albanians that they can only trust Americans. So, to conclude on this question, the Civic League started out as a lobby for Kosova and then became a lobby for all Albanians in the Balkans.
Zeri: You have been to Kosova many times. In May 1990, you came with Congressman Tom Lantos. You have talked about how you were welcomed by Albanians at that time. Can you describe Kosova then and how you see it today?
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1990 AND NOW IS VERY SIGNIFICANT….
DioGuardi: When Shirley and I returned to Kosova after the war, in August 1999, it was almost ten years since my first trip with Tom Lantos. I immediately noticed very great changes. In 1990, the Serbian armed forces and special police were present everywhere. Tom Lantos and I were shocked when we saw how people were beaten in front of our eyes for simply trying to congregate in order to hear us speak. In 1999, Shirley and I saw all of the destruction and devastation wrought by the Serb army and paramilitaries, and we knew that at least ten thousand people had been killed and thousands more were still missing. But we also saw the smiles on the faces of all who had returned and we saw the determination to rebuild Kosova as quickly as possible.
We made two more trips to Kosova at the end of 1999, in October and November. Now, a year later, we are here again, and we see great improvements. Most of the badly damaged homes have been reconstructed, not by the UN, but by Albanians themselves.
As I said earlier, we have observed the municipal elections, and we are impressed by how well the process functioned.
While the difference between 1990 and the present is very significant, we should not forget how much the Albanian people suffered during the occupation. Not only were innocent people killed, but all of their jobs were taken from them and given to Serbs. Many were imprisoned, and most families did not know how they would survive from day to day and whom they could trust. These were terrible years, and only the great will power and positive energy of the Kosovars enabled them to survive. It is obvious to me that while fifty years of communism weakened the spirit of the Albanian people in Albania, the Albanians of Kosova maintained their individual and national spirit and optimism. This is why an independent Kosova is necessary even for Albania, which needs its national spirit reenergized, its economy strengthened, and its people put on the road to western-style democracy once and for all. A free, democratic, and independent Kosova will accomplish this.
Zeri: You are the sponsor of many Congressional Resolutions and other U.S. House and Senate actions on Kosova. How much influence did these actions have on U.S. foreign policy for Kosova? Why was it important to have Congressional Resolutions, floor statements, and hearings in the U.S. Congress?
DioGuardi: In the early years, every resolution and Congressional action met with difficulty, because Congresswoman Helen Bentley worked hard to block them. This forced us to think strategically in order to pass resolutions and to arrange hearings. Thanks to great friends, like Senator Bob Dole and Congressmen Ben Gilman and Tom Lantos, we succeeded on many occasions, and also in spite of the U.S. State Department opposition to any official actions in relation to Kosova.
The Bush and Clinton administrations made great mistakes under Secretaries of State Baker and Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke. It was a signal from James Baker in 1991 that Milosevic took as a green light to do whatever he liked to keep Yugoslavia alive. Later, in 1995, it was a signal from Richard Holbrooke, who brought Milosevic to the negotiating table at Dayton without any Albanian representation, which brought about the war in Kosova. And this is why the Albanian American Civic League, along with thousands of Albanians, demonstrated in front of Holbrooke’s offices in New York, saying to him, "You are becoming a new Neville Chamberlain. You say that there is peace, but there is none for Albanians, and now you have made an agreement with the devil, Slobodan Milosevic." Under these circumstances, with the State Department trying at all costs to keep Yugoslavia together, it became very difficult to pass resolutions in Congress in support of Kosova’s right to self-determination and independence from Serbia.
But, why were the resolutions important, even though they did not pass and did not guarantee anything for Albanians? Because each time we introduced a Congressional Resolution, it gave us an opportunity to put the facts and our appeals for justice on paper, and to show the State Department that the Congress was watching its activity. The U.S. government is great, because the executive and the legislative branches balance each other. And since the legislative branch controls the funds for the State Department and has oversight responsibility for its activities, this puts pressure on the State Department and other executive branch officials to respond more favorably to Congressional action pushed by our Civic League.
Zeri: How did it happen that the Jewish lobby sided with the Albanian lobby on behalf of Kosova?
DioGuardi: Knowing how power works in Washington, I knew that if I complained directly to the State Department about the plight of Albanians in the Balkans without the support of key congressmen, they would never believe me. Instead, they would listen to the Greek lobby and their powerful friends, like Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Eagleburger, who knew Milosevic from the time he was a banker in Belgrade. So it was necessary to get the attention of the State Department through our Jewish American friends in and outside of Congress. There are thirty-four Jewish members of the House and Senate, and it was necessary to enlist their help by demonstrating to them that Albanians were their friends and protectors during World War II, when Albania was the only occupied country that saved its own Jewish population and every Jew who fled there. Albania was the only country where not a single Jew was surrendered to the Nazis, and it was the only country in Europe that had more Jews after the war than before it. We did this by distributing ten thousand copies of Rescue in Albania, which was written by Harvey Sarner, a Jewish American philanthropist, and prepared from information received by Congressman Lantos and me on our trip to Albania in 1990. Lantos and another great Jewish American congressman, Ben Gilman, wrote forewords to the book at the request of the Civic League. This book had a lot to do with bringing the Jewish lobby on our side.
We also distributed "The Expulsion of the Albanians" by Vaso Cubrilovic, a paper that was published in Belgrade in 1937, two years before the Nazis issued the memorandum on the "final solution" for exterminating European Jewry. It outlined a plan for ridding Kosova of its Albanian majority through mass expulsion and extermination. With the Jewish community on our side, the Civic League gained great impetus in our fight against the complicity of the State Department, which, in the early 1990s, wanted to cover up what was really going on in Bosnia and Kosova.
Zeri: In 1990, political parties, beginning with LDK, began to be organized in Kosova. They immediately started to create chapters or branches in the United States and Europe. How much damage did this cause the Albanian lobby in Washington by dividing Albanian Americans and diverting support from the Albanian American Civic League?
DioGuardi: When I went to Kosova for the first time in November 1989, there were no political parties. There was a movement for democracy, and Dr. Rugova was leading the Albanian people of Kosova in their struggle against communism. Hundreds of thousands of Albanians were encouraged to burn their Communist party membership cards in huge bonfires after the Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989. When I met Rugova in his office by the soccer stadium in Prishtina, he was not representing a party. He was a leader for democracy, and this is why we supported him and invited him to Washington and New York in April 1990.
I remember that in late 1990, Ali Aliu, Alush Gashi, and other Kosovars came to the United States and Canada to create branches of LDK, but they did not discuss this with me. They did this behind my back, using the connections that they had gotten through the Civic League. I had brought Ali Aliu to Chicago in June 1990, and months later my supporters there told me that he was speaking against supporting the Albanian American Civic League, saying that Albanians did not need the Civic League anymore, because they now had their own political party and should work to strengthen LDK. "Joe, they are trying to replace our lobby with a Party from Kosova," my friends told me. But, regrettably, I didn’t believe them, until 1992, when Alush Gashi and some members of the Civic League Board of Directors told me that I should resign as president and that LDK would then pay me to be the voice of the Party in Washington. I was so angry at this suggestion that I cursed these betrayers of the Albanian lobby and abruptly left them sitting at a table in Bruno’s restaurant in New York City. (Several members of the Civic League Board resigned at this time in order to spend their time and money supporting LDK, which served their personal interests in the United States and their captive families in Kosova. Later they established a competing group called the National Albanian American Council.)
This brings up the question that some people have asked about why some of the original Civic League Board members quit supporting Joe DioGuardi. One reason this happened is that some of Rugova’s people convinced them that LDK was more important than the Civic League. I told them that if they wanted to create political parties, they were free to do so, but that they still needed a strong lobby in the United States. I said further that political parties belonged in Kosova, not in the United States, and that the Civic League belonged in America and should be supported here, not interfered with. But LDK opportunists and careerists were more interested in maintaining their positions in the Party and in raising money for LDK than in creating a strong international voice for Kosova.
The consequences of this divisive behavior in America were revealed later. Had LDK worked with me to strengthen our Albanian lobby in Washington, I am convinced that Milosevic would have been stopped before the Dayton Accords allowed him to believe that he could get away with genocide in Kosova, as he already had in Bosnia. I truly believe that Rugova and other LDK officials made a big mistake in abandoning the Civic League, after the League had spent so much time and money to bring them to the United States, to open up doors in Congress, and to organize contacts with so many influential people in Washington. They were naïve to think that I was simply going to resign and to turn over the lobby to people who pretended to speak for Kosova, but who were only acting out of their self-interest.
While I did not tell Albanian Americans to abandon LDK, I told them not to forget to support the Civic League. But many LDK supporters in America did not understand that they needed to back the lobby for things that LDK was not qualified to do, especially in Washington, where I, as a former U.S. congressman could, did, and still do accomplish a lot for Kosova.
Albanians from Macedonia initially followed the same pattern in America with the encouragement of LDK. But later they solved the problem by eliminating the U.S. branches of PDP. Arben Xhaferi came to America in February1995 with Iljaz Halimi, Ismet Ramadani, and Fadil Sulejmani, and together they signed a statement that branches of political parties and other associations from Macedonia would be disbanded in the United States. This left only LDK with branches in America. Today LDK is very weak, because its failure to back the Kosova Liberation Army leading up to and during the NATO war alienated many of its former members and supporters. When the LDK leadership realized too late that they were losing support to UCK, they abandoned the organization and reemerged on the Board of the National Albanian American Council. This is why many Albanians refer to NAAC-LDK as one entity. (You can easily see for yourself by comparing the current Board of the National Albanian American Council with the list of former leaders and key financial supporters of LDK—it’s almost the same!)
Zeri: What was and is the level of cooperation among Albanians in the United States?
DioGuardi: Albanians from six Balkan political jurisdictions (Albania, Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Presheva, and Chameria) live in the United States and they each have their own thoughts about what they think is the best way to politically represent their families in the Balkans. This is why it is very difficult to create a united voice for Albanians in America. We still have problems with Albanian officials coming to America as representatives of Kosovar and Albanian political parties that do not work with our lobby in Washington. They have even tried to create another lobby by putting some people in Washington as paid agents. But this only serves to confuse U.S. officials and to weaken our voice for Kosova, in particular. Before the NATO war, this allowed some State Department officials, such as Richard Holbrooke, to think that Albanians would accept "substantial autonomy" instead of independence, which the Civic League had been calling for since 1989. We have never compromised on the sovereign status of Kosova.
Zeri: Are you talking about National Albanian American Council?
DioGuardi: Yes, I am. I do not know what the National Albanian American Council actually tells the State Department, but, before the war, they led the State Department to believe that they could count on some Albanians to settle for something less than full independence for Kosova from Serbia. This follows in the footsteps of the LDK representatives who frequently came to Washington before the war, but who never asked for independence. Needless to say, this represents a big problem for the Albanian national cause. For this reason, we do not cooperate with NAAC, and also because they were formed with the expressed purpose of undermining our lobby—a goal that they will never achieve because we have friends in Washington and many supporters in America and around the world.
The other problem is that NAAC represents people from Albania who support Fatos Nano, someone that I could never support. He is not only against the independence of Kosova, but he is a puppet for Greek foreign policy for Albanians in Kosova, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Presheva, and Chameria. Some of the NAAC Board members are wealthy businessmen who support the Nano government because they want to protect their properties in Albania and have no problem supporting the former Communists. This conflict complicates our work and, together with Shirley Cloyes, I have had to redouble our efforts in Washington and in seeking support throughout the United States. Shirley and I are not paid; we are volunteers. But we collect money to fund the activities of the lobby in New York and Washington. The Civic League has many independent-thinking supporters who will never support the Nano government in Albania and who will never abandon independence for Kosova. I hope that, after the November 2001 elections in Kosova, Albanian leaders will be wise enough to sit down and decide that the Civic League—led by a former U.S. congressman with Albanian blood, and his wife, a writer and former publisher, both of whom work incessantly as volunteers for the Albanian national cause—is the best voice for Kosova in Washington.
Zeri: What is your experience in the United States as an uncompromising fighter for the Albanian national cause, particularly for Kosova?
DioGuardi: Unfortunately, with Milosevic, there was no other solution than war. And, thanks to the KLA, a defensive force of freedom fighters, the Albanians of Kosova had an army that protected the people, their lives, and their property. The United States acted the same way during the American Revolution. The bottom line is that if you do not stand up for your freedom, nobody is going to give it to you.
I had always thought that a war in Kosova would take place, because Milosevic was on a quest for "Greater Serbia," while he was accusing Albanians of planning for a "Greater Albania." But Albanians did not have the power to create a Greater Albania. They did not have a big army, or an atomic bomb. But Milosevic’s propaganda misled the Serbian people, and he proceeded to wage war for ten years across the Balkans. If there had been no war in Kosova, Holbrooke would probably have gotten away with making a false peace with Milosevic in October 1998. (This was when he made the flimsy "October agreement" with Milosevic, which allowed international monitors into Kosova and mandated the withdrawal of Serbian military forces--something that Milosevic never intended to do.) This one-sided agreement, if implemented, would have been the beginning of the end for the Albanian national cause, because Kosova would then never have had the chance to become independent.
Shirley and I went to Rambouillet in February 1999 to tell Hashim Thaci not to sign the agreement. We believed in what Adem Demaci said at that time—that if Albanian leaders signed a paper that said the Kosova was a part of Serbia, it would be used against them in the future. As it turned out, Milosevic refused to sign the agreement anyway, and this garnered world sympathy and U.S. support for Kosovar Albanians, leading to a new opportunity to achieve freedom for Kosova. Today, we must work hard to convince the international community, especially the United States, that without independence, there will never be peace and stability in the Balkans, and Europe will be constantly in turmoil as a result.
Zeri: At the time of the NATO bombing campaign, you sent a letter to President Bill Clinton, asking for the immediate deployment of ground troops and the arming of the KLA. Were you afraid at the time that air strikes might be unsuccessful?
DioGuardi: I was very concerned that air attacks would kill a lot of innocent civilians. President Clinton did a good job in ordering air strikes, but history will show that he was reluctant to do it and that he waited too long. The United States should have confronted Milosevic earlier in Bosnia. But Clinton looked the other way when more than 300,000 Bosnians were killed, and he almost did the same in Kosova.
When the bombs started to fall against the Serbian forces invading Kosova, we witnessed the massive expulsion of the Albanian population, civilian massacres, and the wanton destruction of Kosovar Albanian homes and property. This is why we told President Clinton that if he was afraid of the political consequences of losing American soldiers, he should arm Albanian freedom fighters—the KLA. The U.S. government had secretly armed the Croatians, and this is why the Serbian military suffered damages in Bosnia and were driven out of the Krajina in September 1995. In June 1999, we got a Congressional Resolution sponsored in the House by Congressman Jim Traficant and the Senate by Senator Joseph Lieberman in support of arming the KLA, but a peace agreement was signed shortly thereafter that made this unnecessary. Perhaps Milosevic realized that the KLA was going to be armed and that General Wesley Clark was pushing hard to deploy the ground troops that were based in Macedonia and Albania. It is obvious to all now that conducting air strikes without deploying ground troops was a very inefficient way to stop the war. It led to the death of many innocent civilians, destroyed much property, and allowed Milosevic to displace almost a million people, creating one of the largest refugee crises since World War II.
Zeri: You came again to Kosova, but this time to observe local elections. What is your opinion about the pre-election campaign and the electoral process? Have Albanians demonstrated that they deserve national elections in Kosova?
DioGuardi: Having followed the elections in Kosova closely, I congratulate the Albanian people for their disciplined behavior and their respect for the rule of law. This demonstrates to the international community that Kosova is ready for a democratic society and for self-governance. Comparing the problems that I saw during the elections in Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, and other Balkan countries, the Albanians of Kosova deserve great praise for their peaceful participation in the local election process in October 2000.
Shirley and I have followed the campaigns of the major political parties, in particular, and they all realize that democratic elections are the starting point to the process of self-government and, ultimately, statehood. We would like to see leaders who are ready to demonstrate to the world that Albanians in Kosova are ready to solve problems, such as security, unemployment, sanitation, environmental pollution, crime, and corruption. This will speed up the process of democratizing Kosova and then of solidifying international support for the independence of Kosova.
Zeri: Bush has stated that if he is elected president, he will withdraw American troops from the Balkans. How will the election of George W. Bush impact Kosova?
NO MATTER WHO WINS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE HAS FRIENDS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE….
DioGuardi: Every election in the United States is important, because of America’s huge impact on world developments. Though the Republicans have a small advantage, the result will be very close and cannot be predicted. The good news is that Albanians have friends on both sides of the political spectrum. Whoever becomes the president and the vice president of the Untied States, Shirley and I will go to Washington to continue to lobby the White House and the Congress for the independence of Kosova. And we must demonstrate that it will be in the self-interest of the United States to support the independence of Kosova, because the United States has even greater, more intractable, problems in the Middle East, China, and Africa. Since Albanians have demonstrated that they understand democracy and trust America, and that they are prepared to create a democratic Kosova, the United States should support the independence of Kosova as the key to peace and stability in the Balkans and, therefore, in Europe.
Zeri asked Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi to conclude the interview:
ALBANIANS—THE LARGEST DIVIDED NATION IN EUROPE….
Zeri: Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi, you have greatly helped the Albanian American Civic League in its commitment to the Albanian national cause. Was this a sacrifice on your part?
Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Joe and I have been a team since we met at the end of 1993. One might say that we have sacrificed a lot, but this was our decision. It has been a privilege to work on bringing peace with justice to all Albanians in the Balkans, and especially because the resolution of the Albanian national cause, in my opinion, will determine the future for all of us, Albanian and non-Albanian alike.
The reason that Joe DioGuardi and I met was that I was the first book publisher in the United States to publish a book on the former Yugoslavia from the perspective of the anti-Milosevic forces inside the Balkans. At that time, people in the United States knew very little about Kosova. And, then, the information that they got was mostly from the British academy. This was the case because, for fifty years, Albania was isolated under Enver Hoxha, while Kosova was under the rule of Josip Tito. Throughout this period, the Slavs dominated the academy and the media in the United States and Western Europe. They had numerous people studying in America, working the in the media, and working against Albanians in Washington. Meanwhile, senior U.S. officials, such as Secretaries of State James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger had many contacts with Belgrade, and this is why there was little understanding of the Albanian reality. In fact, the Albanian reality was hidden, and, as a result, it was easy for Milosevic to rise to power in 1987 on a political platform of anti-Albanian racism.
When the war started and escalated in Bosnia, I was one of the main publishers of books on domestic and foreign policy in the United States. I, along with many Americans, watched in horror as images of atrocities from Bosnia-Hercegovina flashed across my television screen. But then, day after day, week after week, month after month, as the images multiplied on the screen, so too did the rationalizations from the U.S. government for its inaction. And my shock mounted when I suddenly realized that nothing was being done to stop the carnage inside the former Yugoslavia, that nothing was going to be done, and that in effect all of us were being forced to become complicit in it.
We were witnessing unspeakable acts of violence and then being told that this was "not our war," that there was nothing we could do about it, that it was a potential "quagmire" into which we would only venture at our peril, and that we could not possibly understand an outbreak of savagery that was rooted in "ancient hatreds." But, I responded that, "No, this is our war," and that if we did not stop Milosevic now, he would become a new
Hitler. I believe strongly that we cannot take democracy and freedom for granted, that each generation has to wage the fight against fascism and ultranationalism. This is why I decided to publish a book that would enable Americans to understand the Balkan conflict from the perspective of the anti-Milosevic forces inside the former Yugoslavia.
The book included authors who were resisting Milosevic from Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and Macedonia. When I met Joe, he criticized me for not including any Albanian author in the book. It was through him and members of the Albanian American Civic League Board that I became educated about the Albanian dimension of the Balkan conflict. And, then, as is so often the case when an outsider comes in to a particular situation, he or she can cast a new light on it. Before I knew anything about the history of the Albanian national question, I grasped its import, and I came to call the Albanian nation "the largest divided nation in Europe and the largest invisible minority in the United States."
Zeri: After the NATO air strikes in Kosova, you did not stop your activity in support of Kosova and the Albanian national question. In September 1999, you authored a public declaration about the solution of the Albanian national issue, and you mentioned the problems that still confront Kosova today, including the issue of Serbian war criminals, the partition of Mitrovice, the status of the Trepca mines, etc. What do you see as the solution for Kosova in the future?
Cloyes DioGuardi: It is a fact that the majority of the great problems in Kosova have not been resolved. But, this has very little to do with the Albanians of Kosova, because this must be solved, at least in the beginning, by the international community. The Kosovars, with their education, energy, and personal sacrifice have made a lot of progress in postwar Kosova. But, today, it is the obligation of the UN to administer Kosova and to solve the problems that are affecting daily life in Kosova. Let us take, for example, the Trepca mines and the fact that Mitrovice is still partitioned. During the war, Joe and I were the first spokespeople to mention the significance of the Trepca mines on CNN, Fox-TV, BBC, and other networks. Many commentators were asking at that time why Milosevic was so interested in Kosova. And we responded that, while Kuwait had oil, Kosova had incredible mineral deposits, including the chromium, gold, silver, and coal, in Trepca.
Then, there is the problem of the Serbian war criminals. We witnessed NATO withdrawing its military forces from Serbia and Kosova without insisting that the indicted Serbian war criminals be apprehended and extradicted to The Hague. Over and over, on internationally televised broadcasts, Joe and I said that there would be no solution in Kosova, if Milosevic and other indicted war criminals were not brought to justice in the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.
Equally important is the unresolved issue of the Albanian prisoners of war, who were illegally brought to Serbia at the end of the war, in violation of the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. government, regrettably, dropped from the Kumanova agreement that ended the war the provision that would have guaranteed the release of the Albanian POWs. This is why we demanded that the Clinton administration talk about this issue, especially to the Russians. While Bernard Kouchner did the right thing when he asked Serbian President Kostunica to immediately release the Albanian prisoners in Serbian jails, unfortunately, other countries, such as Greece and France, failed to support his demand.
Finally, I am pleased that much progress has been made in Kosova, but the progress would have been much greater if the UN Mission were replaced by an Albanian administration and retained only a supervisory role. Without a homegrown Albanian administration, we will always have major problems in Kosova. If we want real peace in the Balkans and in Europe, then we must continue to press the West for the independence of Kosova. We should not delay the resolution of the final status of Kosova, as the world has done with the Palestinian issue with predictable and devastating consequences. Joe and I have often reminded Washington that if the independence of Kosova is not recognized, a fifth Balkan war could be triggered. The latter can be avoided through intensive U.S. diplomatic intervention now, and this will require the Albanian American Civic League to continue its lobbying and media activities in Washington and around the world.
Note: Please visit the Albanian American Civic League website (www.aacl.com) for more information about the work of Congressman Joe DioGuardi, from 1985 to 1989, and the work of the Albanian American Civic League from 1989 to the present.